

Panagiotis (Panajotis) Kondylis

- [Home](#)
- [The Political and Man](#)
- [Power and Decision](#)
- [Science, Power and Decision](#)
- [Planetary Politics after the Cold War](#)
- [The German Sonderweg](#)
- [Answers to 28 questions](#)
- [Quotes and longer citations](#)
- [Translator's Page](#)

Panagiotis Kondylis in English

"Everyone has equal rights to a delusion, since not everyone has the same ability or the same courage in attaining knowledge".

This site is dedicated to making some of Panagiotis (Panajotis) Kondylis's voluminous work available in English.

Anyone who knows Kondylis's writings well in either German or Greek will appreciate that Kondylis (1943-1998) produced books and articles of unparalleled value in relation to the history of ideas, and in particular the European Enlightenment; general or macro social theory; the theory of knowledge; conservatism and political terminology emanating from Europe including during the 19th century; liberal modernism and mass-democratic "postmodernism"; the theory of war; international affairs; as well as in relation to a number of other more specialised topics.

A (near) complete bibliography is available at:

<http://www.lsr-projekt.de/kondybib.html>

Complete list of books translated by Panajotis Kondylis (Παναγιώτης Κονδύλης) into Greek from English, German, Italian, French and ancient Greek, and Greek-language titles for which Kondylis was Editor (Manager) of Series:



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**ONLINE IN ENGLISH, KONDYLIS'S
ASTONISHING SHORT BOOKS:**

***POWER AND DECISION (MACHT
UND ENTSCHEIDUNG)***

and

***PLANETARY POLITICS AFTER THE
COLD WAR (Planetarische Politik nach
dem Kalten Krieg)***

as well as the articles:

"Science, Power and Decision (Wissenschaft, Macht und Entscheidung)"

and

"The German "special way (Sonderweg)" and German prospects"

and the short book consisting of three sets of questions answered in writing, i.e.:

Kondylis's answers to 28 questions put to him in the last years before his premature death.

FOR NEW READERS OF KONDYLIS WISHING TO SERIOUSLY COME TO TERMS WITH KONDYLIS'S THOUGHT, START BY STUDYING CAREFULLY HIS ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS (e.g. 1, 3-6, 12, 14-16, 19-20), PARTICULARLY BEFORE TACKLING *POWER AND DECISION* OR "SCIENCE, POWER AND DECISION".

For a definition of "power", see "Science, Power and Decision", II, p.5ff. (and the translator's notes on the site page: *Power and Decision*).

To find out the real reasons why Karl Marx was one of the greatest thinkers in the history of the social sciences (it has nothing to do with "class struggle", "capital", "exploitation", "alienation", "communism", etc.), see *Answers to 28 questions*, pp. 67-69, and, *The Political and Man*, Chapter II, pp. 195-202 (= *Das Politische und der Mensch*, S. 105-107).

Nietzsche's (Freud and Bergson's) existential (will(volition)-based) understandings of knowledge regarding pre-intellectual (situational) states of mind ingrained in the

senses, occurring in a sociological and historical vacuum, are referred to at pp. 204-205 (*The Political and Man*) = *Das Politische und der Mensch*, S. 107.

To find out why Heidegger is often grossly overrated see *The Political and Man*, Chapter II, pp. 182-191, 198-199, 203, 358; Chapter III, pp. 472-477 (= *Das Politische und der Mensch*, S. 97-101, 104, 107, 185, 245-246). (See also: <http://www.telospress.com/heideggers-being-and-time-a-collection-of-pretentious-and-vague-platitudes.>). With regard to Sartre, see loc. cit., pp. 186-190 (= *Das Politische und der Mensch*, S. 99-100).

For a fascinating discussion of social facts (and both their empirical *and* ideational/ideological ontic aspects), the heterogony of ends, meaning, etc. in relation to the great sociologists Durkheim and Weber et al. see *The Political and Man*, Chapter II, pp. 222ff. (= *Das Politische und der Mensch*, S. 116f.), and as regards sociology's interrelation with history, pp. 235ff. (= S. 123f.).

"Society" is defined by Kondylis in Ch. II, Sec. 3C, pp. 409-413 (= *Das Politische und der Mensch*, S. 212-214). Ch. II, Sec. 3 in general defines and explains social ontology as it pertains to the social relation, the political (social cohesion and social order (social disciplining)) and man (the anthropological (the philosophy of culture = culture as man's nature = man as both nature and culture; Ch. III, Sec. 1A)). Of especial interest is the fact that the friend-foe criterion cannot be the differentia specifica of the political as C. Schmitt purported, since such a criterion applies to the very being of society (loc. cit., footnote 242, p. 404 = S. 209 (*Das Politische und der Mensch*)). Both Schmitt, and his critics who hope to efface or minimise the "foe" in the said criterion, overlook that the existence of both "friend" and "foe" (even if only as potentiality) is something which is a necessary feature, empirically observable, of society as society, i.e. of both the political within the social as well as more broadly of non-political (human, social) relations, and not because "philosophers" think, talk and write about friendship and enmity, and want to make the latter "disappear"...

The spectrum of the social relation and its friend-foe polarity, inter alia, particularly as regards Simmel and von Wiese, feature in Chapter III. Friendship and enmity are also explored by way of Bacon, Empedocles, Plato, Aristotle, Democritus, the *Pantschatantra*, Cicero, Montaigne, Rivarol, Tönnies, Durkheim, Sorokin, Hesiod, Weber, R. Michels, Spinoza, Hegel, Plutarch, A. Ferguson, R. Thurnwald, La Rochefoucauld, G. Halifax, Saint-Exupéry, Ovid, Xenophon, Thucydides, Clausewitz, Virgil et al., in what amounts to a breathtaking exposition of this well-known "Schmittian" (!) topic...

Next, in the event the translator finds the strength and motivation and does not opt to engage in the pleasure of merely being a reader of Kondylis's, and other, works,

The Political and Man (Das Politische und der Mensch)

will be presented in toto within certainly no less than eight years (as of 30-12-2014; Chapter I was completed on 17-10-2015. Translation of Ch. II commenced 18-11-2015 and was completed on 02-02-2017; Ch. III commenced 27-2-17). This is, for those of us who know, the most important work of macro social theory published since Max Weber's *Economy and Society* and it is an absolute tour de force in terms of length and scope. One could even argue it is the greatest book ever written (depending of course on what one values in relation to books).

THE POLITICAL AND MAN - PAGES TRANSLATED: 254 (360) of 652 (38.96%) (247 online)

Chapter I and Chapter II are online

Note: Chapter II, Section 3 constitutes a high point (if not the high point) in the history of general social theory!

Chapter III Sections 1A, 1B, 2A are now also online

In the more distant future, this site's author would hope to translate or at least would hope to see translated:

*The Enlightenment in the framework of new-times rationalism
(Die Aufklärung in Rahmen des neuzeitlichen Rationalismus),*

*The decline of the bourgeois thought form and life form. The liberal modern era and the mass-democratic postmodern era
(Der Niedergang der bürgerlichen Denk- und Lebensform. Die liberale Moderne und die massendemokratische Postmoderne),*

Conservatism (Konservativismus),

Theory of War (Theorie des Krieges),

as well as other works by Kondylis such as:

The new-times critique of metaphysics (Die neuzeitliche Metaphysikkritik),

The Political in the 20th century. From Utopias to Globalisation (Das Politische im 20. Jahrhundert. Von den Utopien zur Globalisierung),

Montesquieu and the Spirit of the Laws (Montesquieu und der Geist der Gesetze),

Marx and Greek antiquity (Marx und die griechische Antike),

the two articles from *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (Basic Historical Concepts)*: "**Reaction, Restoration**" („Reaktion, Restauration“), and, "**Dignity**" („Würde“),

the article "**Jurisprudence, State of Emergency and Decision. Fundamental remarks on Carl Schmitt's "Political Theology"**" („Jurisprudenz, Ausnahmezustand und Entscheidung. Grundsätzliche Bemerkungen zu Carl Schmitts „Politische Theologie““),

as well as Kondylis's anthologies with their respective introductions: ***Der Philosoph und der Lust** (The philosopher and pleasure)*, ***Der Philosoph und die Macht** (The philosopher and power)*;

the articles "**Utopia and historical action**" („Utopie und geschichtliches Handeln“), "**Regarding the intellectual(-spiritual) structure of utopian constructions of the 16th and 17th centuries**" („Zur geistigen Struktur der utopischen Konstruktionen des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts“), "**The old and the new godhead**" («Η παλιά και η νέα θεότητα»),

and,

Kondylis's essential introduction to, and essay on, **Machiavelli**,

and introductions to: Chamfort, Lichtenberg, Rivarol and Pavese;

if the vicissitudes of life permit...

[unfortunately, a translation of Kondylis's first book: ***Die Entstehung der Dialektik. Eine Analyse der geistigen Entwicklung von Hölderlin***,

Schelling und Hegel bis 1802, cannot be contemplated as a possible translation project given that the above list of works will almost certainly not be translated in toto]

Any enquiries or comments concerning "Panagiotis Kondylis in English" should be directed to:

pkproject@live.co.uk

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I note that my main motive in producing the translations is a deep appreciation of the honest attempt at achieving "value-free" (or "axiologically free") knowledge in the social sciences or humanities (i.e. knowledge that is descriptive, explanatory (theoretical) and ethically, not methodologically, non-normative (regarding method: empirical verification (or e.g. reference, in the case of the ideal type) and logical consistency, but nothing more, are sine qua non)) - something little appreciated in institutions of "higher learning" (at least as far as the "social sciences", "philosophy" and the "humanities" are concerned), by and large staffed by people involved, more often than not, at best in sophisticated cultural critique or insightful microanalyses, but alas more commonly, in the reproduction of (moralising) normative ideology, if not complete and utter nonsense (e.g. a "professor of the history and philosophy of science", who is a psychologist and does not, compared to Kondylis, even have a basic working knowledge of the history of philosophy, or the history of science, or even the philosophy of science, is nonetheless an "expert" on "feminism" and "gender stereotypes", etc. etc. etc....). The translations are not "easy-to-read" English texts and obviously require further proofing and editing, however, they do err on the

side of faithfulness to the German text, and it is hoped that the English reader will not be dissuaded from developing a genuine interest in Kondylis's thought. It goes without saying that even the best of translations are always poor substitutes for any original text, particularly if we are dealing with a body of work at the peak of human achievement - the translator wants readers to know that the text they are reading is "faithful", but is also a *translation*.

[Paul Gottfried, leaving aside for the most part whether his substantive criticisms of *Power and Decision* etc. have any validity (they do not, Gottfried, inter alia, misattributes to Kondylis monocausal reductionism when *Power and Decision* already implies the centrality of the factors or forces (the social relation, the political and man (the anthropological)) in the multi-dimensional (human) social-ontic spectrum expounded in Kondylis's social ontology, as well as misunderstanding the notions of "will", "power", "value freedom" and the operation of a syllogism...), has found the original German text "testing" to read at best: "What renders these particular reflections particularly inaccessible is the ponderous prose; and it is hard to see how the editor could characterize them as stylistically elegant" (Gottfried Paul: "Review of Piccone and Kondylis", TELOSscope, Sunday, August 2, 2009, <http://www.telospress.com/review-of-piccone-and-kondylis/?temp-new-window-replacement=true>)]

Anyone who particularly values Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Max Weber (as well as many other remarkable thinkers or "observers of human affairs" - Aristotle, Montaigne, Hobbes, Spinoza, Clausewitz, and Marx readily come to mind*) will probably become very fond of Kondylis's work.

The reading will be (very) difficult, but the gain in knowledge immeasurable.

[*Because almost inevitably most great (and not so great) thinkers in the social sciences, history and philosophy display both varying degrees of empirical and logical-argumentative weaknesses or even serious flaws, as well as all their strengths and insights, or at least while maintaining their value as "negative" polemical points of reference, those I have named are just a small list which could very easily be expanded to include: the great classical historians (Herodotus, Xenophon, Polybius, Sallust, Livy, Tacitus, Appian, Priscus et. al.), the Sophists, Socrates and Plato, La Rochefoucauld, Montesquieu, La Mettrie, Hume, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, Kant, Tocqueville, Nietzsche, Pareto, Durkheim, Simmel, Schumpeter, E. H. Carr, K. Mannheim, Raymond Aron, Werner Conze, and many, many others: from Epicurus, Duns Scotus, Occam, Bacon, Galilei, Descartes, Locke, Vico, Rousseau, Chamfort, Lichtenberg and Comte; to Grotius, Pascal, Pufendorf, Diderot, d'Alembert, Holbach, Turgot, de Sade, Herder, Rivarol and Schiller; to Leopold von Ranke, F. Engels, W. Dilthey, Tönnies, Husserl, Bergson, Werner Sombart, G.H. Mead, E. Cassirer, Leopold v. Wiese, Levin Ludwig Schücking, Bernard Groethuysen, Karl Polanyi, Pitirim Sorokin, Morris Ginsberg, Fernand Braudel, T. Parsons; to Arnold Hauser, Hans Morgenthau, J. Burnham, Cesare Pavese, J. Plamenatz, Geoffrey Elton, Reinhart Koselleck, K. Waltz, Hedley Bull, Michel Vovelle, G. Arrighi, P.M. Kennedy, G. Contogeorgis, J. Mearsheimer and so on and so forth.]

[The great (as a matter of the translator's personal taste, but also (once) acknowledged as "classic" or of extremely "high" quality and craftsmanship) authors, artists, composers, painters, sculptors, artistic achievements, (social) psychologists, et al., etc. include:

Homer, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Pindar, Sappho, Pheidias, The Parthenon, Horace, Virgil, Ovid, Cicero, Juvenal, The Bible, Hagia Sophia, Byzantine iconography, Kalidasa, Li Bo (Po, Bai), Tu (Du) Fu, Boccaccio, Dante, Cathédrale Notre-Dame de Chartres, Borobudur, Angkor Wat, Basilica Papale di San Pietro in Vaticano, Michelangelo, Da Vinci, Raphael, Titian, Cervantes, Chaucer, Shakespeare, Milton, El Greco, Velazquez, Rembrandt, Kölner Dom, Hieronymus Bosch, Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Wagner, Verdi, Handel, Rossini, Schubert, Goethe, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, Chekhov, Balzac, de Maupassant, Baudelaire, Monet, Cavafy, T. S. Eliot, Camus,... Terence, Lucretius, Propertius, de Troyes, Camões, Malory, Ariosto, Tasso, A. Pope, S. Johnson, Wordsworth, Hugo, Flaubert, Valéry, Hölderlin, Heine, Rilke, Pushkin, Gogol, Turgenyev, Palamas, Sikelianos, Kazantzakis, Seferis, Elytis, Yeats, Joyce, Pound, Pessoa, Auden,... Yasujiro Ozu, John Ford, Jean Renoir, Kenji Mizoguchi, Buñuel, Rossellini, Ophüls, von Sternberg, Welles,... Picasso, Stravinsky,... and of course many, many others, too many to name and admire...]

Kondylis in historical context:

Kondylis's oeuvre draws together all the main strands in the social sciences (historical science, sociology, anthropology, the humanities etc.), philosophy and the history of ideas, which contain the elements necessary for someone to engage in absolutely consistent science (as far as the human-social sciences are concerned at a macro or general level, consisting of three main overlapping branches: history, sociology, social ontology (incl. anthropology)). In other words, where (cultural-critical, deconstructivistic, (self-)ironising) "post-modernism" in its various forms draws on aspects of the thought of e.g. [La Mettrie, de Sade,] Nietzsche, Freud, Boas, Marx, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, et al. - apart from, inter alia, reflecting, recycling and reconstructing thought patterns emanating from highly technicised hedonistic-consumeristic (massifying and atomising, levelling and equalising, ideologically more spatial than temporal, also in practice relatively more mobile than static) Western mass democracy (with its extremely intricate division of labour, "taken for granted" access to water, energy, mass production; blurring of public and private spheres, mass bureaucratisation of the state, corporations, the mass media, and, historically more fluid attitudes to collective identities such as race, nation(-state), religion, sex, or "gender", etc., including (individualistic) "self-realisation" and "minority" group "identity politics", non-eurocentric Other worship, at times ideologically "eliminating" Nature (biology) in Culture, and a (mass-democratic) analytical-combinatory thought figure rather than the (bourgeois) synthetic-harmonising thought figure) -, and not infrequently, but not always, correctly acknowledges the relativity of values, the centrality and ubiquity of (relative degrees of ideational, ideological and/or physical) power in human-social relations, and the perspectivity (historicity) of knowledge, but errs in maintaining a relativity of knowledge, notwithstanding its own claims to knowledge and irrefutable empirical and logical criteria, as well as (contradictorily) usually adhering to some kind of normative programme and having

certain aesthetic preferences, Kondylis managed to build on the great Western tradition of empirical observation and logical coherence, to the extent it has existed, in order to produce a body of work which essentially brings to a near as humanly possible completed high point or "perfection" what thinkers like Aristotle, Marx and Weber (Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Clausewitz et al.), at least in part or albeit imperfectly, sought to achieve with regard to understanding human societies at a macro or general level: description and explanation of what *is*, without, so to speak, contaminating the description and explanation of reality with an *ought*. It goes without saying that absolutely consistent knowledge of the *Is* is politically-polemically at best only partially useful, because human societies and the individuals that comprise them exist per definitionem in various forms of ideological (and usually less frequently, physical) struggle over *Ought* (as part of the social-cultural-human manifestation of the natural-biological drive (urge or impulse) of self-preservation) - apart from the quantitatively insignificant exceptions, who can *also* observe human affairs consistently dispassionately. Kondylis's oeuvre therefore constitutes the ideational (ideological) domain of the few.

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- [Answers to 28 questions](#)
- [Quotes and longer citations](#)
- [Translator's Page](#)

***The Political and Man* by Panagiotis Kondylis**

Chapter I (and all subsequent chapters) in two versions:

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Title pages and table of contents (updated upon the completion of the translation of every further (sub-)section. For chapter and (sub-)section summaries, scroll down this page):



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For *The Political and Man*'s bibliography or list of (around 1000) references, a German edition of *Das Politische und der Mensch* by Panajotis Kondylis can be purchased in hard copy book form at:

<http://www.amazon.de>

or in pdf form at:

<http://www.degruyter.com>

Some citations from Chapter I and Chapter ((sub-section) summaries

.... "Thus, so-called cultural anthropology, as it was popularised for instance by Ruth Benedict or Margaret Mead, aimed originally at

breaking up everything which gave the impression of an anthropologically inherited constant, into cultural influences. In this way, many unilateralities (or one-sidednesses) or coarsenesses of the conventional (or traditional) anthropology of drives, of Reason and of races, were of course shown in their true light. Yet in the process, the mark was widely overshot, and that which was now called anthropology was hardly to be distinguished anymore from vulgar sociologism, which by the way is also a genuinely mass-democratic ideological phenomenon: just as the old notion of social hierarchy was frequently justified by means of anthropological fictions, so mass-democratic egalitarianism sought backing in respect of the assumption that humans constitute the resultants of their social conditions, that is, equality amongst humans could already be guaranteed through the equality of conditions."...

... "Now, as soon as the exclusion of anthropological formulations of a question (or examinations of problems) at the level of the social-theoretical construct has seen to the dispelling of the imponderabilities of human behaviour, only a single step remains to be taken for the safeguarding of ponderability at the level of complex society: the (direct or expected) identification of the construct with social reality. Where humans behave for instance in the sense of "system rationality" or according to the communicative logic of language, as these are described in the social-theoretical construct, there a particular knowledge about man is actually unnecessary (or superfluous)."...

..."First of all, it is obvious that the aforementioned paradigm shift, which put an end to bourgeois anthropocentrism, is of an ideological character; it therefore may not serve as the starting point of a scientific argumentation. That means: an argumentation, which, with reference to the end of anthropocentrism, would demand the putting aside of anthropology, would a limine be false. Because anthropocentrism, anthropology and man as a historically-socially acting being constitute three different magnitudes; the elimination of the first does not have to mean the elimination of the second, and the elimination of the first two (at the level of ideology or of social theory) can in no case mean that man in actual fact ceases to exist. Formulated differently: the beginning and the end of anthropocentrism do not coincide with the beginning and the end of anthropology, and the end of anthropology, i.e. talk of man, cannot be the end of man, just as man has not taken his beginning from anthropology. There were, and in fact are, always only humans, who pursue (or are involved in) or abolish anthropocentrism or anthropology – and a scientific theory, which wants to take into account this fundamental fact, must argue anthropologically in a comprehensive (or broad) sense,

that is, thematise man (i.e. make man a subject of discussion) in respect of his action and his motivation (also in his quality (i.e. characteristic) as author (or originator) of theories about the value (or merit) and anti-value (or demerit) of anthropocentrism and anthropology). The necessary social-ontological depth is therefore reached when the perceptions of humans on the value (and status) of man and his objective doing (i.e. acts) are distinguished very thoroughly and it is ascertained that the latter [objective doing (i.e. acts) of man] are more stable and more homogenous than those convictions are; the base (or terrain) of practical or theoretical doing (i.e. acts) accordingly constitutes the base (or terrain) of the scientifically indispensable talk of man, that is, the base (or terrain) of an anthropology which can also account for all the respective represented (supported or justified) anthropologies or negations of anthropology."...

... "Aversion to the insight that humans and their acts lie at a deeper level than their anthropological or anti-anthropological perceptions, is actually much more frequent and much more widespread than the postmodern uprising (or rebellion) against anthropocentrism and against anthropology as science. It takes root in the ideological-polemical need to anchor normative positions, which in the final analysis can have meaning only in relation to humans, in higher and more comprehensive authorities, whose objective constitution (or composition) sets as narrow as possible limits on (or boundaries around) human imponderability, while the ponderability of the world and of society correspondingly rises. The polemical component consists in that these normative positions, and the "objective" authorities bearing these normative positions, come into being as counter concepts and often as downright conceptual reversals of earlier concepts. The age of theocentrism defined God as the authority before which the imponderability of concrete man had to stop – either through his conscious subjection to divine commandments or, by contrast, through the absolute prospectlessness (or futility) of an uprising (or rebellion). But also the epoch of bourgeois anthropocentrism typically avoided as far as possible leaving concrete man to his own uncontrollable preferences (or predilections); bourgeois anthropocentrism therefore demanded him to live in accordance with the commands of supra-human hypostases, namely Nature or History. Bidding farewell to anthropocentrism and at the same time to anthropology gave rise to new authorities inside of mass-democratic social theory. The said new authorities functioned, as it were, as stream (or river) beds that could channel human action all the more easily as this time they did not have to go into the reasons and depths of the same human action; "system rationality", frictionless communication laid out on the structure of language, reasonable (or prudent) economic calculus (i.e. calculation) or

the behaviouristic symmetry of stimulus and response, were now supposed to ensure ponderability in the same sense as formerly god-willed or nature-conforming behaviour did.

Behind the facade of all these past and present constructions, however, concrete humans stir in their endless variety of form, in the imponderability (or incalculability) of their action and the uncertainty of their action's consequences. These irreducible facts of the matter can of course be largely discarded through rationalisation (i.e. as explanation or justification), but every social theory some time or other has to stumble over these irreducible facts' effects, and then the question is directly or indirectly posed as to what then might these beings be, which have persistently disregarded the numerous representations of, and proposals for, harmony, in history until now. Anthropologising (or talking about man) remains inevitable, even if anthropology is forced into abdicating [its power and pre-eminence in (social-scientific) theory]. The age of anthropocentrism, when Pope opined, "the proper study of mankind is man", understandably provided anthropology as a discipline certain opportunities. An anthropology, though, had already developed in the womb of ancient ontology (we remind ourselves for instance of the Platonic parallel between the strata of being (Is) and the strata of the soul), whereas the theology which came later had to likewise acquire an anthropology with the intention of making understandable what drives humans to the violation of the harmony of the Good. But mass-democratic social theory too does not in actual fact make do, despite its in principle repudiation of anthropology, without (tacit) anthropological premises and assumptions. Between the inevitability of these latter (tacit) anthropological premises and assumptions and the adhering to that repudiation of anthropology, an internal guerilla war takes place, which can never end in peace. One often believes in having already disposed of anthropology because one can, without major losses and complications, do without the old anthropology of drives (urges) and of Reason; already in regard to calculating or ethical rationality, however, things become much more difficult, since this calculating or ethical rationality, without sufficient anthropological underpinning, hovers in the air."...

..."One basic component of the mass-democratic thought figure in Foucault consists therefore in the declaration of war against bourgeois anthropocentrism and its anthropology. The other basic component appears above all in his later work and consists in the demand for self-realisation, which, as we know, even formulated in code, ends up in a certain image of man or presupposes the same such an image of man. In declared agreement with "present-day struggles" against the ruling forms

of power (or power forms), Foucault typically enough wants to raise the same question as the supposed originator of anthropology, Kant: “who are we?”; with that question, he connects the aim of “bringing about new forms of subjectivity, while we reject the kind of subjectivity which was imposed on us for centuries”. Foucault of course does not pose that question as a diachronically thinking anthropologist, rather he wants to know how it relates to the present-day historical moment. All the same: no reason and also no possibility exist in respect of shaking off a centuries-long ruling – and obviously harmful and dispensable – subjectivity, if no, until now, suppressed forces in man as genus (i.e. species or race) (“we”) conflict with the said harmful and dispensable subjectivity. What is, therefore, in man treated like a child (or led by the nose) and held down (or oppressed), what justifies the highly evaluative (value-bearing or judgemental) statement that we have become “captives (or prisoners) of our own history”? Foucault would have to go into (or take on) this aporia (i.e. doubt, contradiction or paradox) because he requires a new subjectivity not simply as a functionalistic sociologist and social engineer, who ascertains a gulf between conventional (or traditional) modes of behaviour and new social conditions (relations or circumstances), that is, between “psychical” and “social systems”, and wants to remove this gulf, no matter with what signs (i.e. symbolism). On the contrary, he thinks in normative categories, and from the new subjectivity he expects emancipatory effects (consequences or results). "...

..."“Human dignity” and “human rights” constitute just as little truths which the social subsystem (or part system) of science discovered and then put at the disposal of society, as for instance the doctrine (or teaching) of man as image and likeness of God, whose place the said “human dignity” and “human rights” took. The positivisation of the law (and justice) takes place at a logically subordinate level (or stage), at which the ultimate questions of the polity as regards meaning and identity are not posed, because at the level of premises they are held to be solved; essentially things are not different in respect of the Code of Hammurabi or in respect of Roman law (and justice). That area (or realm) of the law (and justice), which is seemingly or really indifferent to those ultimate questions, can be called positive law (and justice), its existence however proves nothing about the power and lack of power of politics, but only

that a more or less greater part of the law (and justice), under conditions of social stability, can be seen as politically irrelevant. Moreover, this part of the law (and justice) can never incorporate in itself (or assimilate within itself) the entire area (or realm) of the law (and justice); as much as it may expand (or extend itself), it must remain outside of the ideologically sacrosanct place in which the articles of faith mentioned above linger undisturbed. And if positive law (and justice) in its indifference vis-à-vis ultimate questions seems relativistic and arbitrarily manageable, then this relativism only constitutes one side of the dualistic complex “relativism-universalism”, which, as we know, characterises the ruling ideology in mass democracy. The consequence of the relativism of the content pertaining to positive law (and justice) should, in any case, be the formalism of a legitimation, which would be based on the mere following of (or compliance with) certain procedures. However, the formal (i.e. form-related or form-adhering) procedure and the modes of acting connected with such formal procedure in themselves keep intellects(-spirits) (or minds) busy only when the essential content-related questions have found an acceptable solution for the socially decisive forces, when, that is, the material foundations of the social system appear so solid that a reference to the said material foundations of the social system could serve as direct confirmation of ruling ideological topoi (e.g. affluence as proof of the superiority of democracy). Should these foundations crackle, then the procedure itself becomes a content-related question, or else the content-related questions bluntly disregard all questions of procedure.”...

...“Contemporary history therefore does enough for its part in order to heighten awareness of the examination of problems of a social theory centred on man and the political – provided of course that one is in a

position to put in order (or classify) contemporary history in terms of universal (or world) history, and to recognise deeper continuities, without being put off by the evolutionistically underpinned arrogant self-assessments of modern society. Our main concern here, however, is not the status pertaining to universal (or world) history of contemporary history, but that dimension of depth of social theory, which is called social ontology. As our preceding arguments (or discussions) have hopefully shown, no large-scale social theory can manage without an – even reluctant or tacit – recourse to basic anthropological and political categories. The political and man were and are the most comprehensive and most flexible theoretical framework for the putting in order (or classification) and the understanding of social-theoretically relevant phenomena. This priority of the *theoretical*, that is, of the descriptive standpoint implies, on the other hand, that for us our concern cannot be to protect “man” against the inhuman anonymity of “systems” or to save his ethical personality from its supposed degradation by materialistic economism etc.. Those, who project onto man’s nature an ethical-normative ideal so that the lack of realisation of the same ethical-normative ideal amounts to a degeneration or devastation of man, complain and worry about “man”. Man is, however, indestructible and is in complete existential fullness here, and the only presupposition (or precondition) with regard to his indestructibility and complete existential fullness lies in the fact of his mere existence, not in a certain way of life. That is why both the functionalistic dissolution of the human [sphere or element], as well as the human [sphere or element]’s ethical-normative interpretation, which directly or indirectly pays homage to a substantialism against which functionalism then turns, are to be rejected. A third, social-ontologically and historically sound way of looking at things has to start from the banal ascertainment that since the times of the

primeval (or primordial) horde there is no period of history in which we would not recognise specifiable (namable or assignable) basic given facts of our own behaviour. Similar considerations enable insight into the social-ontological importance (status or value) of the political, of which we likewise expect exclusively theoretical and not ethical-normative explanations (insights or information). Indeed, the theoretical fertility of this insight can be proved in several and important part questions (i.e. secondary (incidental or minor) questions), thus e.g. during a methodical (i.e. methodological) clarification of the relations between social theory and the science of history, or in the attempt at an overcoming of the artificial alternative in “individualism vs. holism”.

The programmatic putting first of the political and of the anthropological allows, finally, the constant, positive or negative continuing (or picking up the thread) of a thousands of years old social-theoretical tradition – and indeed not only of the West and not only of the (Western) modern era. The frequently mentioned smug self-confidence of mass-democratic social theory, the conviction in respect of a radical break with the “pre-modern age” etc. is often articulated in the form of an ignorance or ignoring of older theoretical positions. The translation (or transmission) of age-old questions into an ever-changing and all the more complicated vocabulary gives rise to the impression of constant theoretical progress, in relation to which the claim to originality is based not seldom on the lack of sufficient knowledge of sources and of the literature; what for the obscure doctoral candidate is prohibited, brings others fame (or glory). The reminding of the age of central methodical (i.e. methodological) and content-related questions seems to cause uneasiness because the said

reminding eo ipso refreshes the memory in respect of the age of the (social) world and of man."...

In **Chapter I**, post-World War 2 (mass-democratic) ideology in social theory (e.g. as represented by Parsons, cybernetics or cybernetic systems theory, the open system, Luhmann and functionalistic systems theory, Habermas and the theory of communicative action, "intersubjectivity", an evolutionistic philosophy of history, the evolutionism of differentiation, Foucault; rational choice theory, economism, economistic anthropology and economistic social theory; G. Homans and behaviourism etc.) is pulled apart and exposed in order to set the scene for Kondylis's own comprehensive theory of the social relation or social-ontological perspective in Chapters II-V, which draws and builds on aspects of formal sociology and interactionistic points of view, whilst having a non-substantialistic and non-normative understanding of the political (or political factors) and man (or anthropology). Chapter I includes mention of: the difference between anthropocentrism, anthropology and man as a historically-socially acting being, the spectrum and (intersubjective) mechanism of the social relation, (historical) changes in values, the inseparable co-existence of man and the social, how various aspects or activities of society (political, aesthetic, religious, scientific, economic etc.) interrelate at a general level; the centrality of, and inevitable tension between, both relativism and universalism in the ruling mass-democratic ideology; a distinction between politics and the political against a common backdrop of the (social-ontological question of the) cohesion of society and the maintenance of social order, the conceptual construction of "world society", as well as telling references to Herbert Spencer, Piaget, the Is-Ought and "community-society" distinctions, Tönnies, Durkheim, Gehlen; the (bourgeois) modern

era's philosophy of the subject, anthropology and ideals of Reason; the confusion of anthropocentrism and anthropology, Weber, Giddens et al..

Chapter II

Chapter II (Section 1) begins with the very important contrasting of Dilthey and Husserl as to the (social)ontic roots or foundations of philosophy, and it is pointed out how Western philosophy reached the threshold of social ontology in the 20th century, whilst also indicating the polemical origins, in the history of ideas, of the emergence of the (ideological) critique of culture associated with "instrumental thought", "thoughtlessness of technology (technique)" etc.. Kierkegaard appears within the boundaries of the discussion, only to leave in search of the ideology of "genuine" existence rather than stay in the exploration of the constitution of the social (or society). Preliminary comment is made about the social relation between individuals (and aspects of anthropology) as being part of social ontology's research area, but not exhaustive of such a research area, since logically the social-ontic or society as a whole must exist prior to, and be broader than, the examination of the social relation between individuals. As regards philosophical analysis of the social relation, inter alia, Heidegger's supposed non-ethicism is exposed in the struggle between the so-called actual (real, true or genuine) and the unactual (unreal, untrue or ungenuine), and Sartre at best only touches upon the fundamental issues (e.g. the spectrum of the social relation) while remaining beholden to his own rather impressionistic, literary or theatrical style. Significant points are made about Schütz and the social relation, as well as about the ethicism and normativism of Buber and the dialogicians [in fact, the I-Thou interrelation(ship) can be seen as a "philosophical" precursor of the ideology of "tolerance" and "diversity" in Western mass democracies] - the dialogicians' precursor, so to speak, Feuerbach then leads us to a high point, if not the highest point, in the **development of the social sciences**. Karl Marx is seen now, for the first time in the exposition of the history of ideas, in the light of his true and colossal theoretical value: as theorist of the social relation as regards man's existence vis-à-vis man in society, i.e. on

the basis of the pre-existence of society and from the point of view of society, and as regards man's ((human) society's) existence in and vis-à-vis nature (as well as the (changing) reciprocal effect of both human society (man) and nature on each other to the extent there is such an effect); furthermore, Marx's theory of ideology is highlighted as a first-rate social-scientific achievement in how it at least touches upon the fact that every ontology or theory must be preceded by a social-ontically determined state of mind and that every ideology regarding social and extra-social being contains elements found in all such ideologies (power-claims and the drive of self-preservation (as anthropological constants), belief in and attribution of meaning, separation of the world into "good" and "bad", identity (the familiar) and anti-identity (the Other), etc. (as social-ontological constants encompassing the anthropological constants)), notwithstanding that Marx's (recurrent) economism and (at times full-on) ethicism do not allow him to develop a social ontology worthy of value-free (i.e. descriptive, non-normative (and explanatory)) science [of course man's evolution is totally beyond the scope of *Das Politische und der Mensch* and is therefore not addressed, i.e. it is not of concern here to draw a distinction between e.g. the various types of hominidae (great apes), nor to draw attention to evolution up to and throughout homo sapiens sapiens etc. - the distinction between man and animal as can be observed by the layman suffices here]. The discussion of philosophers in the realm of the social ends with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, whose anti-intellectualistic epistemological and anthropological, existential views exist in a sociological and historical vacuum.

Section 2A of Chapter II surveys the two major kinds of founding of sociology (as represented by Weber and Durkheim respectively), having first hinted at the (structural or formal) points of commonality and difference between social ontology, sociology and historical science. The discussion in respect of Max Weber shows how the great sociologist did not theorise the social relation or social action as part of a fully developed social-ontological analysis of what is a constitutive part of all societies, but rather at best mixed (or confused) the social-ontological level of analysis with sociological(-historical) analyses or in trying to differentiate between historical science and sociology. The intractable problem of deriving averages and regularities from the different subjectively meant meaning of a variety of actors exposes Weber's (and Schütz's) analytical weaknesses when the heterogeneity of ends brings about social facts. Weber's use of "meaning" and "understanding" also does not serve to adequately found sociology as a scientific discipline with its own specific differences and traits (vis-à-vis history and

social ontology) - since such use would more likely apply to the distinction between the humanities and the natural sciences at a much broader level - but rather, inter alia, polemically sought to rebut Comte or Marx's (natural law-related, and highly unscientific) sociological philosophy of history. Apart from dealing with the discrepancy between Parsons's (social-ontologically relevant) theory of action and Parsons's (normative) sociological analysis, Kondylis highlights Weber's epistemological failings in combatting the philosophy of history with methodological individualism, while in practice employing ideal types corresponding to social facts (cf. Durkheim's theory) in basing his often brilliant sociological-historical analyses on the difference between conceptual constructs and reality. Seemingly paradoxically, the other great sociologist, Durkheim, notwithstanding the normativism and relative lack of historical depth in his sociological analyses, was able to go one major step further than Weber (in terms of the clarity of his methodological stance, if not in practice) in founding sociology as a scientific discipline. Psychologism and the individual psychologies of humans are not irrelevant to the observer of human affairs (e.g. in scientific historiography), but social facts and the study of such social facts in sociology arise from an epistemological decision based on social facts' existence through human action. Such social facts, which as facts are ontically obviously more than just tangible things or objects (since they result from human action), are what can be apprehended beyond mere introspection, i.e., they incorporate, apart from the humans acting in relation to the social fact, the socially held (by the said humans) notion and or ideology of (belief in) "the navy", "the government", "the economy", "the law", morality, religions, movements, fads, languages, social groups, etc.. Furthermore, the heterogony of ends also plays its part in requiring sociology to examine social facts beyond individual psychologies, goals etc.. We are again reminded that in practice Weber's view regarding representations (or notions) of collective constructs in humans' minds, amounted more or less to Durkheim's view of the existence of social facts. Reference is also made to Comte's and Spencer's functionalism and the limits and inflexibility of social facts when compared with historical reality, particularly when social facts are imbued with normativism. Accordingly, Durkheim's ethical-normative tendencies come into conflict with his own understanding of the social fact and his (explicit and implicit) acknowledgement of the heterogony of ends, as well as of the full spectrum of human action, i.e. not only order, agreement or concord etc., but also, anomie, disagreement or conflict etc..

Section 2B commences with a discussion of how the epistemological clarification of the difference between sociology and history is confused with research practice in regard to social-historical reality, whose existence cannot be simply confined to the necessary epistemological distinction, since social-historical reality exists as a constant becoming or continuum which both sociology and history (as well as all other disciplines in the social sciences and humanities) deal with. The discussion specifically turns to Durkheim's treatment of social facts and his failure to not include diachrony sufficiently and (logically) consistently in his research practice. The importance of comparisons and research into causes, inter alia, make the boundaries of historical science in practice fluid with regard to those of sociology, and vice versa. Historical science and sociology are both a science of man's social action, but only sociology of the two must be defined as the science of social action in social facts, whereas the science of history can also deal with facts other than social facts (e.g. specific acts as between specific individuals). In any event, Weber as a historian, and his use of the ideal type, ensured that his historical research would not be confined to psychologism as an (extreme) idiography. The benefit of Weber's approach was a heightened ability to isolate the laziness or ideology behind viewing individual cases as reflections of general situations from having a clear notion of the epistemological-fictive character of types, classes and generalities. Kondylis then goes into the very fine distinction between the uniqueness and singularity of a historical event, as well as into the status of a historical event as a cause or effect in a causal interrelation; the avoidance of psychologism in focusing on observable action rather than personal psychology is particularly noted, as well as the almost automatic extending of historical individuality into the sociological realm. A strict concept of individuality cannot be consistently employed either in historicism or any research practice; the use of abstractions is unavoidable if one wants to generalise in regard to what will be more than one concrete case, or in the illumination of just one concrete case, including as regards causes. The close interrelation between, or unavoidable intersecting of, history and sociology is looked at in detail from the perspective of the practice of these disciplines. The social fact is by no means sociology's exclusive object of study, and the historian cannot but come to grips with clashes (of interests, ends (goals), (individual and collective) subjects etc.), and the heterogony of ends, if he wants to achieve scientific insight into human affairs; Durkheim's

understanding of the social fact remains attached to its static-institutional aspect, and his evolutionistic philosophy of history constitutes anything but a strict historical science, notwithstanding that evolutionistic philosophy of history played a pivotal role in the development of modern sociology and historical science. A scientifically and methodologically valid functional way of looking at historical-sociological matters is distinguished from functionalism as such, as well as from eschatology and evolutionism. The predominant mass-democratic thought-figure, however, offered functionalism fertile ground to take root in sociology while rejecting not only a philosophy of history, but historical method or consideration in general (e.g. Parsons). On the other hand, the scientific explanation of social phenomena that seeks theoretical explanation beyond a narrow horizon necessitates that the sociologist also deals with historical matters (see the noteworthy or remarkable work of: Weber, Marc Bloch, Tilly, Eisenstadt, B. Moore et al.). Content is historical, or has a decisive historical component, and without an analytical flexibility to explain *the relations* between factors in regard to every specific situation, sociology will inevitably be trapped in e.g. functions, (sub)systems, normative preferences, ideology. C. W. Mills has pointed to the necessarily limited scope of the scientifically valid use of many concepts in sociology, particularly when their use claims validity in regard to world history and social formations beyond the West European world. A sharp distinction between historical and unhistorical sociology can therefore only have (a very) limited scientific (theoretical-descriptive-explanatory) application in the investigation of social phenomena; whether e.g. individual action or structure has primacy can only be a matter of the specific analysis of a specific situation in sociological and historical research. A fixed hierarchy of causal factors in the form of a (scientifically) universally valid table of categories is thus an impossibility, as is a (scientifically) universally applicable method which depends on a categorial hierarchy or established conceptually. Research interests since the 1960s with regard to once unimportant or irrelevant matters (such as the everyday life of the common man, sexuality, deviance, difference etc.) reflect the (then new) ruling mass-democratic ideology.

In **Section 2C(a)**, the modern origins of methodological individualism are noted as developing in liberal ((social-)economic) polemics (e.g. Menger) against both the holistic and organicistic foe

(with roots in Catholic Aristotelian scholasticism), which had Adam Müller as its major proponent after the French Revolution, and the historical school of economics in general. Politics or ethics have no necessary correlation with methodology (Schumpeter); Weber did not, however, share Schumpeter's perspicacity in rejecting the individualistic point of view as a methodological approach to be used in sociology (notwithstanding its use in economics). Thereafter, Hayek and Popper achieved fame in the climate of the Cold War as theorists (i.e. polemicists) of methodological individualism without contributing anything of substance to social science - their only substantial "scientific" value being in the use of their respective positions as objects of criticism, which Kondylis easily picks apart as, inter alia, lacking in logical coherence, and being overly prone to a one-sided ideological representation of their foes' position(s), and of course, of empirical reality. Röpke, along with Hayek, and their "neoliberalism", are referred to, as are (logical) issues pertaining to utility maximisation, psychologism, homo oeconomicus, behaviourism, Popper, Homans, Coleman, and the ethicising-normativistic and fundamental empirical errors of both methodological individualism as well as a holistically meant ontological independence of a supposedly indestructible society.

Hayek and Popper feature in **Section 2C(b)**. Their methodological individualism falters in their own acknowledgement of the heterogony of ends - and they do not even realise it. There is discussion of psychologism, Weber and Hegel, as well as Hayek's and Popper's zealous, contradictory and fatuous polemics (they are e.g. in favour of methodological individualism but inadvertently make arguments against it when they support the notion of the unintended consequences of action (in a one-sided fashion), as well as, in Hayek's case, the ideology (myth) of the "invisible hand"). Of course, Hayek and Popper use the heterogony of ends selectively, and not logically consistently vis-à-vis their own avowed methodological individualism, or supposed opposition to "historicism" or philosophies of history, as well as vis-à-vis historical reality and argumentation in general. Reference is also made to von Mises, Menger, Mandeville, Adam Smith, Vico, Marx, Engels and Durkheim.

Section 2C(c) delves into the social-theoretical implications of the unintended consequences of action. Durkheim may have erred as to these consequences' supposedly necessarily beneficial effects, however his use of the social fact ensured he did not fall into the logical-epistemological trap of

methodological individualism. The social whole, never frozen in time, is something (notionally and actually) more than the mere sum of its (always moving, dynamic) parts (individuals and their acts); not of course as the existence of a metaphysical being or other entity other than individuals and their acts, but as a social fact or social facts in which the ontological autonomy of the social is condensed: it is one thing for A not to attack B because A fears B's strength, and it is quite another thing if A does not attack B because A has contemplated the likely or certain legal consequences, or the "scandal", which such an attack will provoke. Society materially consists only of individuals, but the individuals as individuals do not constitute indispensable constituent elements of society such that if one individual e.g. is removed from society, that society becomes another society or ceases to exist as a society; society is not reducible merely to individuals as individual people (in a particular space in time) without the effects of other individuals' acts, groupings, thoughts, etc. (taking place in spaces and or times other than where we are at any given moment). Kondylis employs a distinction between quantity and quality to assist in understanding the existence of various ontological (including invisible and intangible) levels (of society and social facts in general, apart from individuals as separate individuals) without at any moment suggesting, in terms of matter, anything other than the existence of individuals in making up society. Only those who have a metaphysical belief (e.g. in ethically-normatively meant individualism and an individualistic monism) insist there is *one* being (Is) and its strata are homogenous. Society (i.e. human society, as human culture to the extent it distinguishes itself from the animal kingdom, and from the groupings or societies in the animal kingdom) not only pre-exists every (human) individual, but also provides a framework of social facts (obviously not larger in scope than society): rules, norms, customs, traditions, laws, ideologies, myths, religions, etc., with which every individual (at least potentially) interacts, and very often restrict individuals in acting upon their wishes or desires (whether shaped (in part) by society or not, and regardless of whether individuals do act contrary to the said mechanisms of social disciplining). Every social fact has a social-historical(-structural) background, i.e. (often innumerable and over time unknowable separate) interactions of individuals without which the social fact could not exist, and in relation to which present-day individuals act. Social facts (which apart from institutional constructs include the imponderable effects of the heterogony of ends, the (often) unforeseeable outcomes of collective action) reside in and come from an ontological zone of supra-individual factors both necessary for the comprehension of individual behaviour as well as being beyond directly observable individual behaviour (since e.g. the said ontological zone of social facts/supra-individual factors resulted from historical individual and group behaviour beyond what is directly observable by any given individual at any given

time and in any given space); however, this ontological zone is always materially identical with individual humans' acts. Subjective individual sympathies and antipathies cannot and do not consistently or absolutely dominate the relations between people since the said ontological zone is a zone of some kind of normative social disciplining. Reference is made to other attempts by methodological individualists to get around social facts (e.g. Homans, Watkins, Danto), but of course their efforts are (scientifically) to no avail. Moreover, in respect of methodology, concepts pertaining to the collective cannot be (fully and adequately) conveyed with concepts pertaining to the individual, otherwise there is only one ontological level or zone and no society. No matter what methodological individualists do, say or write, they cannot ever get around the fact of society; ex post facto observations (common to all methodologies) of a fact as a result of individual actions is related to the fact of society, otherwise the heterogony of ends would not be a recurrent social phenomenon and individuals would be able to predict the future. Mention is made of Hayek's misunderstanding of Weber's ideal type, particularly as regards empirical reality's role in ideal-typical construction, and the sub-section ends with instructive exemplification by way of two of the greatest (macro-)sociological historians: Tocqueville and Marx - Hayek and Popper had more in common with Durkheim than what they thought. Every society and every institution consists of individuals and the relations between individuals, including in the (historical) background and in view of the heterogony of ends.

Methodological individualism's wrong equating of social facts with a teleological view of history (as in Marxism) is discussed at the beginning of **Section 2C(d)**, before attention turns to Popper and his unsuccessful attempts at unifying methodologically both the natural sciences and the humanities, while, inter alia, trying to avoid monism, induction, "historicism", "holism" or "fatalistic determinism" - all to the displeasure of methodological individualists such as Hayek (cf. I. Berlin). The discussion then examines in detail both Popper's failings as regards "societal (or generally scientific) laws" and under what circumstances such "laws" may have valid scientific application. The vital distinction between law and causality then arises - law is causality; not every causality is a law. In rejecting the possibility of teleological law bindedness in history and pure nomology, it does not follow there is no causality in history, that there can be a pure idiography (with reference to chance in the name of human "freedom"), that regularities signify the existence of laws in regard to (historical) human action, or that the natural sciences necessarily only find and examine laws in the strict sense. However laws, strictly speaking, can only exist in nature; laws and causalities are only ever *necessarily* methodological and ontological points of orientation - where they actually

apply is a matter of case by case examination. There is mention of I. Berlin's (partly correct, partly skewed) view of two "determinisms" which supposedly abolish "free will", and his ideological individualism is exposed in trying to argue for meaning and purpose at the level of the individual, but not at the level of history and the human race, whilst leaving open the possibility of free will leading to "evil" (something most ethicists-polemicists don't want to be accused of doing). The equating of all kinds of causality with law ultimately serves an ideological - not scientific (strictly descriptive and explanatory in terms of logical consistency and empirical reality; never normative) - purpose. Thereafter follows an enthralling discussion of how the notion of free will is irrelevant for sociological and historical research practice, including definitions, in passing, of what sociology and history are, and references to Herodotus, Thucydides, E. H. Carr, M. Weber et. al.. Berlin had doubts about Popper's epistemological monism, notwithstanding their common methodological individualism; the latter thinker's "Covering Law Model" and its inherent flaws (e.g. in supposedly unifying the ontological levels of nature and human existence formally-epistemologically while supporting that personality and free will at the human ontological level do not and cannot exist at the ontological level of nature) give at least some credence to Berlin's doubts. The difference between the natural-scientific and sociological-historical way of explanation is highlighted with reference to phenomena, classification, causality and law bindedness, and Popper and Hempel's confusing of epistemology and ontological levels is further dissected, including Popper's misconstrual of the burning of Giordano Bruno, of situational logic in the light of his own Covering Law Model, and of course Popper's preference for ideology and polemics over strict scientific and logical coherence. The sub-section ends with Homan's methodologically individualistic anti-Popperian psychologism, which, however, cannot explain why, on the basis of nomological presuppositions and since Homans ignores the social relation and the primeval (or original) social dimension generally, universal psychological laws have in different times and places produced different value content(s).

Section 2C(e) gives an overview of methodological individualism's various encounters with Parsons and "holism", the "(norm) system" e.g. in regard to the question of social order and disorder, and in particular of the varied confrontations or even reconciliations between proponents of microstructures and macrostructures, including "corporate groups", "networks", the restoration of the individual to the centre of theory, the discussions surrounding ethnomethodology, microsociology, macrosociology, (communicative) interaction etc. in the 1960s and 1970s (Homans, R. Collins, R. Emerson, J. Alexander, J. Coleman, G. Ritzer, et al.). In turn, the theoretical inadequacy of such approaches is highlighted (especially in respect of the transition or influence between microstructures and macrostructures), and the subsection makes a preliminary reference to the anthropological and, more tellingly, the social-ontological dimension, whose existence for the purpose of logically and empirically consistent sociological or social-scientific investigation has not hitherto been fully or adequately fleshed out.

Social-ontological factors or forces in the case of specific societies are consequently connected with the most different of historical and social phenomena, in many different ways, and constitute a spectrum whose parts and aspects can come into conflict, and often do, as regards content. No sociological concept in a strict sense can be applied to all societies without exception. Sociological research (ultimately) cannot but have a historical character. History (historical reality) shows us the relativity of content and values. While social facts as crystallisations of (collective and or individual) social action are the main concern of sociology and

can never last permanently, social ontology has as its central object the fact of society - social facts can only ever occupy a part or aspect of the social-ontologically ascertained overall spectrum of the fact of "society", and "society", which can only exist as social facts and under the pressure of the overall social spectrum, is always prone to, and must (eventually), change.

Chapter II, Section 3 is in many ways the theoretical high point of *Das Politische und der Mensch*, and of social theory in general. In **Section 3A**, social phenomena are seen in relation to the social-ontic forces or factors of the social-ontic field upon which social phenomena temporarily and precariously crystallise. It then becomes clear that social ontology is the study of those forces or factors which are constitutive of society (social being) as "order" and "disorder", whereas the other social sciences deal with the social phenomena which exist always and only against the background of pre-existing society, i.e. social-ontic forces or factors (spread out in the form of a spectrum). Social ontology is strictly non-normative without ever formulating regularities, causalities, laws, or without ever stating what will specifically happen in terms of collective or individual social action, apart from outlining in an ideal (or abstract) formalised fashion the framework within which social action takes place and what exists in general. The other social sciences investigate specific causalities and regularities, and without an adequate appreciation of the social-ontological background against which all social action takes place, they will invariably

have difficulty in their investigations and explanations. In the case of social ontology, because all the social-ontic factors or forces are ubiquitous, because such factors or forces always exist at least as possibilities, they are never examined as causes of specific phenomena or events; the variety of form of the social world (throughout history) can only be accounted for descriptively-empirically because of the said ubiquitousness and potentiality of all social-ontic factors or forces. Social ontology investigates the necessary but not the sufficient conditions of socially living humans' behaviour and action - the social sciences trace causal relations, i.e. the sufficient conditions. For instance, from the point of view of social ontology, the chances of war and peace are equal, but from the social-scientific standpoint, the said equal chances are distributed unequally in accordance with the situation and period in time. Social ontology examines the social-ontic common denominator in order to shed light on the individual social sciences and their respective limits, whereas the boundaries between e.g. sociology and history are of a thematic and methodological kind, determined by these disciplines' logic of founding and their respective power claims in the realm of knowledge. A lack of social-ontological insight ensures confusion and quarrelsomeness in the social sciences generally. Social ontology, which treats the factors or forces of the social-ontic becoming without going into the specific outcome of human action on each and every occasion, is a strictly nomological science, whose generality is broader than, and superior to, the social sciences. Regularities described by sociology

and the (probable) outcomes of human action are of no concern to social ontology, which is always multi-dimensional and whose various dimensions manifest themselves in the content of the individual social sciences. While the boundaries between historical, sociological, political and anthropological studies, i.e. the social sciences in general, remain fluid, social ontology in its examination of the spectrum and mechanism of the social relation, the internal dynamics of the political, identity formation, power etc., offers the individual social sciences a point of orientation and a refining of social scientists' powers of judgement in light of a general notion of humans and human behaviour - without of course, as social ontology, going into the sufficient reasons of the phenomena being explained. With the assistance of social ontology, and in the knowledge of the openness and flexibility of the social-ontic field, an always wide-awake observer of history does not permit sociology to lapse into ideological and superficial generalisations. While social facts as crystallisations of (collective and or individual) social action are the main concern of sociology and can never last permanently, social ontology has as its central object the fact of society - social facts can only ever occupy a part or aspect of the social-ontologically ascertained overall spectrum of the fact "society", and a society, which can only exist as social facts and under the pressure of the rest of the parts or aspects of the overall spectrum of the fact "society", is always prone to, and must (eventually), change. The fact of society is therefore broader and more fluid and more open than every individual social

fact, and this fact of society produces the social facts which gnaw away at or destroy other social facts; social-ontological viewpoints bring to light only necessary, never sufficient reasons and conditions. Social ontology is the examination of how social facts interrelate with the fact of society. Social-ontological factors or forces in the case of specific societies are consequently connected with the most different of historical and social phenomena, in many different ways, and constitute a spectrum whose parts and aspects can come into conflict, and often do, as regards content. No sociological concept in a strict sense can be applied to all societies without exception. Sociological research (ultimately) cannot but have a historical character. History (historical reality) shows us the relativity of content and values. Formal sociology and symbolic interactionism or micro sociology confuse the social-ontological and the sociological, though are of use in contemplating the spectrum and the mechanism of the social relation. Next, the discussion leads us to the two great sociologists, Weber and Simmel, and how each of them, for different reasons, operated within both the realms of sociology and social ontology, without ever clearly separating the disciplines and producing analyses fully consistent with both empirical reality and the conceptual-logical founding of these disciplines. Such lack of epistemological separation between sociology and social ontology has further worsened after decades of the phenomenology of the lifeworld and symbolic interactionism. Social ontology is the study of the original and always present and active (complementarily and or

antithetically) aspects of the social-ontic, which ensure the openness and endless productivity of history; social ontology deals with the slowest time flow regarding human affairs given that the spectrum of the social-ontic forces and factors has remained stable since the beginnings of mankind's history. Change in historical and sociological phenomena is qualitative, and such phenomena struggle, ultimately in vain, to prolong themselves in time (even if the period of time in question lasts for millennia). The spectrum of the social relation, its diachronic stability and the synchrony of its original aspects, constitutes an age-old knowledge found in all cultures, particularly in relation to human social behaviour and motivations. However, a scientific pre-education is necessary to understand the subject matter of historical and sociological research: customs and institutions, world theories (i.e. world views) and rituals. The social-ontic as a deeper stratum of existence found in all social formations (notwithstanding that different aspects of the social-ontic may feature more intensely or more broadly than other aspects in different times and places) means that social ontology does not examine the history of ideas or ideologies as history and sociology do. Social ontology recognises the terrain on which ideas, which are necessarily connected with concrete humans, flourish, and explains why social-ontic factors can only unfold through ideas. The necessity of the ideational mediation of everything social is a social-ontic fact and must be explained social-ontologically. But ideas as specific content do not possess any social-ontic necessity - in this sense, there are no ideas,

there are only humans living in society and culture, whose social-ontically determined and explainable action must be connected with what one commonly calls ideas. Sociologically-historically and culturally different societies are able to be understood (at least in part) by outsiders because the social-ontic field is common across all societies, notwithstanding actors' different self-perceptions and the (sociological-historical) reality of cultural relativism. Understanding is thus revealed as the fundamental mechanism of the social relation. Social ontology is the study of the social-ontic field and constitutes the social-ontic field's conceptual reconstruction. Social ontology is an empirical discipline, it is always tested against empirical reality, but it is not positivistic in terms of using only the inductive method, nor does it proceed nomologically like the physical sciences. The factors or forces it conceptualises are never necessarily uniformly active; they are spread across a spectrum whose aspects also in part come into conflict as to their content.

Section 3B of Chapter II begins with a discussion of what is relevant as society (i.e. society as the social) for social ontology. Why cybernetic systems theory (lack of insight into the necessary preconditions of historical and sociological phenomena), sociology (cannot comprehend even the sufficient preconditions of historical and sociological phenomena), and functionalistic systems theory (the biological and anthropological constants expounded as basic human needs do not

pre-exist human societies, since humans only exist in (relation to) societies, but intersect with the institutions humans create for the socially regulated satisfaction of needs), cannot constitute a social ontology, is explained. Social-ontological description deals with the social-ontic factors or forces which are indispensable and equiprimordial in all societies. There is nothing else beyond such factors or forces for the purpose of understanding society with reference only to ascertainable empirical reality. Researching nothingness may be of interest to certain "philosophers" or "great thinkers", but we have neither the being nor the time for such inquiries. Social ontology, in its study of social-ontic forces and factors and the spectrum of the social relation, should always allow free two-way transition to sociology and history in order to be of use to the latter two content-specific disciplines, and in turn, to itself be reaffirmed as empirically valid. Kondylis then turns to the crucial concept of social "order" (and "disorder", which is an impossibility in the social-ontological sense given that the fact of society as order is always taken for granted). Such social-ontological order as the fact of society, free of content and hierarchies of factors, however, is contrasted with historical-sociological order, which is always ultimately subject to change since it is always connected with content and a hierarchy of factors, and whose relative "order" or "disorder" is always dependent on, and sociologically-historically examinable in relation to, a concrete situation. It is not surprising, however, that sociologists have confused the "socialisation" of individuals with normative

preferences. From a non-normative and strictly descriptive point of view, there is no conflict between the social and the individual. The individual does not exist separately along with society, but always inside of, or in relation to, a society (or collective) of individuals and their culture and institutions. In other words, social-ontologically, the social, the collective, and the individual always overlap in one way or another with one another and can never be fully separated. It follows that the personal, narrowly defined, is what uniquely belongs to every individual (even though much of the personal - emotions, opinions, behaviours - is the product of collective influence), but social-ontologically the (human) social is made up of humans who are all individuals. The social is therefore not merely collective, nor are the individual and the social opposite notions, but the individual and the collective are manifestations of the social against the background of the fact of society. The action of an individual is not collective, but is necessarily, just like collective action, social. Social ontology is therefore the field of aspects or constituent elements of the fact of society (e.g. the individual and socially living peoples' individual action, groups, group action, ideas, ideologies, culture, etc.). Society cannot be reduced to isolated (plain, ontically autonomous) individuals because all individuals exist with social attributes, i.e. the fact of society is primary (or: everything to do with humans occurs against the background of the fact of society). Kondylis then makes reference to various thinkers' positions which imply a (possible) conceptual demarcation of sociology from what

would potentially amount to a social ontology (Geiger, Pareto, Weber (the examination of important social facts such as the economy and religion, and their correlation, constitute Weber's indirect dealing with social-ontological questions regarding the being and coherence of society), Durkheim (correctly saw that social facts as interactions are the object of sociology, but did not grasp that the fact of society itself cannot be a mere social fact, nor can the fact of society be understood by using customary sociological (theoretical-conceptual) tools; social facts only exist against the background of a pre-existing society, and Durkheim's talk of "collective ideas" amounted to a normative mysticism rather than to an insight of social ontology), Simmel (did not realise that society as a complex of socialised individuals is a tautology; hence, society includes interaction which is constitutive of society, but is not just the mere interaction of previously isolated individuals), Vierkandt (saw that apart from mutual interaction, a joining together (union or amalgamation) was also needed to effect a society; Kondylis further points out that whilst interaction per se cannot constitute the *differentia specifica* of society, the factor or element which is the *differentia specifica* of society is necessarily a certain interaction - giving unfolding space to, and setting limits for, other interactions - *with* specific features which give society its specific characteristic), Parsons (his examination of institutions and society's need for union, delimitation and self-sufficiency, which can never exist permanently since all societies (eventually) change, leads us to questions of the social-ontic

dimension of the political and the political's ubiquitous presence in the social; social ontology as teaching of society's being has at its core the relationship between the social-ontic dimension of the political and other social-ontic dimensions)). Just as the social-ontic field, compared to historical and sociological crystallisations, is more fluid and more open (all social institutions are eventually destroyed (transformed or created anew) by the tensions inside of the spectrum of social-ontic factors or forces in the social-ontic field), likewise the social-ontological concept of society is always more fluid and more open than every sociological concept of society. Whether there are state institutions in the modern-era sense, or no need for state limits and political government as in the case of a hypothetical world society or the primitive horde, the political in its interaction with the other aspects of the social-ontic remains decisive in any talk of (social cohesion and) the being of society in the context of the social-ontological concept of society applying to all societies both theoretically and empirically.

Chapter II, Section 3C reiterates that social ontology is not an unambiguous and one-dimensional study of the social which leaves real social phenomena unexplained, but must deal with the multi-dimensional nature of the social-ontic existing in a spectrum full of tensions in order to adequately describe human phenomena (relations, behaviour or action). Three factors or forces are from the outset found in such a spectrum: the social relation, the political and man. The social relation, as a constituent of society, represents the being of society. The spectrum and mechanism of the social relation can only be fully developed in society or against the background of society. Society is not merely relations between separately observed individuals or the sum of such relations. However, society contains interactions which do not necessarily relate to all individuals, yet seek to create a binding framework of interactions for all other interactions. Such (potentially) binding interactions, like all relations, have a spectrum and mechanism, but also have the character of the political which refers to society as a whole acquiring order and cohesion. The political is the interaction of all interactions. Wherever society is fundamentally a binding correlation of

interactions, the political exists. The anthropological, i.e. man, is obviously a necessary part of all relations (since we are not for instance talking about ants or bees), more so in the case of the mechanism than the spectrum of the social relation. Man's involvement in the creation of the political is of particular interest, especially since man's nature is culture. The being of human society is the being of culture. Social ontology and social-ontologically oriented anthropology do not deal with cultural content and the sufficient conditions of this or that culture, but only with the necessary conditions of culture as human nature. The social relation, the political and anthropology (the study of man) are in no way ever hierarchised or prioritised, they are always equiprimordial and mutually dependent aspects of the social-ontic. Neither sociological "holism" or historical methodological individualism will do. Next, the social relation's examination is distinguished as between sociology and social ontology. Permanent movement within the social relation's spectrum between the extremes of friendship and enmity helps ensure that individual and collective social phenomena are never subject to nomological explanation. The social relation's mechanism, which never changes and permanently operates throughout the social relation's spectrum, applies to social action, understanding, rationality and language - also ensuring there is never any permanency (or permanent ubiquity) of concrete historical social phenomena, no matter how such phenomena are defined or how much they are taken for granted in any given historical period (e.g. from nomadism, feudalism and racism, to feminism, deconstruction and post-racialism). The political is, of course, a social relation, and the spectrum and mechanism of the social relation fully apply to the political (so that everything social has the potential to become political); however, not all social relations are political. That is why the friend-foe criterion cannot be the *differentia specifica* of the political as C. Schmitt purported (since such a criterion applies to the very being of society). Both Schmitt and his critics, who hope to efface or minimise the "foe" in the said criterion, overlook that the existence of both "friend" and "foe" (even if only as potentiality) is something which is a necessary feature, empirically observable, of society *as* society, and not because "philosophers" think, talk and write about friendship and enmity. The political is a particular social relation which gives (and seeks to give) society, order and cohesion. In society, everything is interaction, however not all interaction is political. Kondylis next draws a distinction between "the political" and "politics", the latter being the different (institutional and non-institutional, changing) historical concretisations of the former - the political is always constitutively existent in society as social cohesion and social order. Both the political and politics are therefore to be found in every society, and any imagining of society without them is precisely that: imagination (always with concomitant normative-political preferences and power claims). [In fact, the constitutive nature of the political means that e.g. two great philosophical-political strands in Western thought (that of Hobbes and that of Rousseau) and the debates surrounding them, have existed and burdened thousands of thinkers without having a sound conceptual-factual (i.e. scientific) basis: in short, there is no pure "state of nature" for humans; society and the political must always be presumed when talking about humans, and the spectrum of human action from extreme friendship to extreme enmity is always at least potentially omnipresent in toto]]. In recent decades, contractualistic liberalism, individualism and economism have been used in polemics against the state and politics to promote an ideological understanding of society (or supposed lack thereof). The quantitative extension of crystallisations arising from relations between individuals cannot explain how social cohesion and social order remain in place notwithstanding the chasm which may exist

between social rules, laws etc. and their real-world operation - the theoretical inadequacy arising from a lack of understanding of the political, the pre-existence of society and the stricter or more flexible binding interpretability of rules at the social level rather than the arbitrariness at the personal level, is what follows from the positions of R. Nozick, J. Elster et al.. The political exists because society exists, and human-social activities and institutions develop from the political not instrumentally but within the context of society with its inherent or necessary social cohesion and order (i.e. its political), irrespective of how such cohesion and order is defined or operates on each and every respective occasion. The political is interwoven with human society from the beginning of human society, whereas politics, as the political from the perspective of subjective bearers, constitutes that human activity through which various individuals and groups seek to impose (support etc.) their understanding of society's cohesion and order and or of how society's cohesion and order should be. Society is then defined as a certain interaction (or mutual influence) of individuals which attains such an expanse and density that in society the question of cohesion and of order in the form of a specifically political question as to the common good is posed, in relation to which the thereby outlined field of tension of the political is set in motion as soon as it is a matter of bindingly defining the common good, that is, of the political, by invoking the political's specific point of view to be put in the service of a concrete politics (in contrast to another politics). And since politics exists on a particularistic basis, interpretation of the common good is multi-faceted as well as ideological, and hence the struggle for the bindedness of interpretation of the common good becomes inevitable. Every current governmental state of affairs in all societies, from the primitive horde to modern mass democracies, seems to be ongoing because particularistic politics must always draw from aspects of the particularisable generality of the political, i.e. from cohesion and order. Society can now be defined as a collective of humans, every one of whom can raise a claim to bindingly define the common good, so that the social-ontologically necessary rules of living together (i.e. co-existence) make up the object of an incessant activity in respect of definition and of interpretation, and consequently represent both bearers of social cohesion and of social order as well as vehicles for the attainment of particularistic ends (goals). Common, at their face value, meanings and notions, such as the common good, thus turn into a battlefield for their binding interpretation, as a specific aspect of the political commands. In regard to the third ontic aspect of the social, a social-ontologically oriented anthropology, which is concerned with human nature as culture in its interaction with the social relation and the political and with the openness and plasticity of the social-ontic field, is not the same as anthropology in general and associated disciplines, which often deal with cultural content. Kondylis then briefly touches upon the mechanism of the social relation and the role it plays with the social relation's spectrum in shaping what is specifically human. The need for identity and meaning, and associated power, in the context of culture, merges with the drive (urge or impulse) of self-preservation, or such need even takes the drive of self-preservation's place (self-sacrifice as the command of identity). On the basis of understanding, rationality and language, which make up the mechanism of the social relation, an "intellect(mind)-spirit" is developed and branches out. And finally, identity, power and intellect(mind)-spirit are channeled into the political, which in turn crystallises in one or another kind of politics while trying to bindingly define social cohesion and social order. Hence, the anthropological, the political and the social relation are intertwined with one another in constituting a unity, which is the being of society as the object of social ontology. Neither the anthropology of Reason, nor the anthropology of drives (urges, impulses), neither

substantialism (as concrete qualitative metaphysics), nor functionalism (as abstract quantitative metaphysics), suffice for a social-ontologically oriented anthropology. What counts, based on the empirical evidence of human action throughout known history, is "humani nihil alienum". And even though human nature might be culture, man can never be totally free of the determinations of nature, nor can man be formed purely on the basis of cultural criteria. The openness and malleability of culture, which has produced so many different cultures, does not exist beyond the causal determinations of nature and history, nor is what is called freedom something ethical-normative, particularly if one considers that all actions commonly known as atrocities and are attributed to "blind or bestial" nature, occur in culture with culture's means. Culture can be a normatively charged concept only in the language of ethics, not of social ontology. Man has always been, and will always be, in culture and nature. The latter two cannot be separated as far as man is concerned - neither can they be separated from society. The social relation and the political mediate between man and culture. Man develops as a cultured being and has the capacity to historicise his own nature, and even external (to him) nature (at least to some degree). The structure of social cohesion and of social conditions is determined not least of all by the outcome, on each and every respective occasion, of the struggle of mankind against external nature. Marx's great truth is even more telling today when the surpassing of the shortage of goods due to rapid technical progress (Industrial and Technological Revolutions etc.) has put in place societal changes of a planetary magnitude. Yet culture remains embedded in nature. Kondylis ends what is for the translator the greatest chapter in the history of macro or general social theory by reiterating that the social-ontological analysis of the social relation and of the political, just like social-ontologically oriented anthropology, only deals with the necessary, not the sufficient conditions of human action. Since the anthropological factor only exists *in* society and never *before* society, and is consequently omnipresent, and since the historical record identifies a plethora of cultures, not only can future human cultures not be predicted, but neither can human culture be limited ethically-normatively. The truly great Thucydides, an incomparable milestone in the history of the social sciences, saw that man's stable nature meant that either in war or in peace, in cooperation or in conflict, man's "good" and "bad" side are simply facets of the same man who seeks self-preservation and the extension of his own power either through physical and or intellectual(-spiritual) means. Something similar applies to the great La Rochefoucauld. The point is, that for anthropology to be of scientific (i.e. non-normative, descriptive, explanatory (theoretical) and empirically valid) use, it must be social-ontologically oriented, that is, it must accompany the other two social-ontic aspects: the social relation and the political. Empirical research can then deal with historical, sociological and psychological expositions. Kondylis's general theory can only be falsified by empirical findings of human relations and situations which burst open the Kondylisian conceptual framework. The translator wishes anyone who wants to find such empirical data, good luck.

Chapter III

Chapter III, 1A commences by outlining from the history of ideas the transition

from a content-laden view of History as Progress, accompanied by Man as a participant in such History, to the functionalism of formal sociology in which there is no longer any substance or essence in History and Man, but society as a functional ensemble with humans functioning in different ways according to the functional requirements of the social(-functional) ensemble. In contributing to the paradigm shift from the (bourgeois) synthetic-harmonising thought figure to the (mass-democratic) analytical-combinatory thought figure, formal sociology separated history and historiography from society and sociology; whereas Comte and Marx had a philosophy of history which catered for both history and sociology. Interestingly, formal sociology's emphasis on forms and rejection of any philosophy of history led to a supra-historical founding of sociology, which has implications for social ontology, something the formal sociologists did not even consider. From Lazarus to Dilthey, Vierkandt and hermeneutics, Kondylis then traces notions of society as involving relations, interaction (mutual influence), while shedding the last vestiges of the philosophy of history and even individuals as stable subjective bearers and objective meaning contexts, to end up in function, force and movement (rather than the fixed, [in] itself same, and substantial) in the thought of the young Simmel. However, Simmel, who never let go of the community-society (ultimately false) dichotomy, failed to see the political which makes a society out of interactions, nor did he understand that functionalism (in his thought, and moreover in later systems theory supporting the supposed "rationality of the system") amounted to an ideological metaphysics in need of an explanation like substantialism. Functionalism in Simmel's immediate successors such as Vierkandt (as it were, a precursor of cybernetic systems theory), not only turned its back fully on the philosophy of history, but also referred to natural science, which had replaced the (fixed) object of knowledge with the relation and relativity. The "popular way of thinking" had overestimated the "unity of the personality", and with the dissolution of substances into functions, everything became interchangeable in space, and time was displaced as the main form of understanding the social (see also L. von Wiese). Nonetheless, Simmel and von Wiese's conceptual and epistemological confusion surrounding formal sociology's notions of "pure", "general", "special" sociology, including the empirical inability of associating much disparate content with specific forms (e.g. forms of socialisation), as well as the fact that sociology, to the extent that it is not history, is per se a matter of formalisation in any event, mean that Simmel's distinction between pure and general sociology (or general and special sociology according to v. Wiese) is ultimately of ad hoc (e.g. micro-sociological) use, and cannot provide the scientifically-descriptively more useful conceptual tools found in Kondylis's epistemological distinction between social ontology and sociology. The problems surrounding pure forms as an omnipresent criterion (e.g. "union and disunion" or "nearness and distance"), and law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity) as the recurrence of phenomena and correlations to which the criterion is applicable, given that such law bindedness does not actually exist (only causality exists in the human world of interaction), as well as the confusing of pure forms as formal criterion with pure forms as a steady constellation or correlation of relations which acts constitutively in every social construct (e.g. "primus inter pares"), plagues Simmel's and v. Wiese's efforts. Moreover, the very criterion of "nearness and distance" is not a form but a pair of concepts representing, in part a datum or force under whose influence forms come into being, and in part an analytical criterion which can be applied to forms, which came into being in such a manner. V. Wiese inadvertently arrives at the fact that the separation of form and content can only happen at a level where the main matter is the spectrum of the social

relation in general. However, he did not draw the necessary conclusions which would have led him to a social ontology distinct from formal sociology referring to historical content as a stable constellation or crystallisation of relations (i.e. as formalised content) - nor did formal sociology ever accept the existence of anthropological factors (absolutely necessary for a social ontology, along with the political, a philosophy of culture (the nature of man (human nature) is culture, and culture is man's nature, i.e. man is always also a part of nature, as well as being a cultural being), and the mechanism of the social relation which lead to the manifold historically attested social and cultural forms), since formal sociology always functionalistically deemed such anthropological factors to be "substances (or essences)". Interestingly, Max Weber's social action or social relation, which identified the importance of meaning, did not place social action or the social relation against a background of anthropology and the philosophy of culture; he too, including in his lack of investigation of the mechanism of the social relation, fell short of formulating a social ontology. Finally, Simmel did not manage to ever fully accept the pre-existence of society, because formal sociology sought a purity, even though Simmel realised that individuals could not be, free from such a pre-existence; but social science cannot be a zoology of animals living alone, and Simmel erred in asking about the possibility of society in relation to society's genesis rather than its cohesion.

Section 1B explores formal sociology's (v. Wiese's) notion of the formal criterion of "nearness (proximity)" and "distance", and how it touches upon, and points to, Kondylis's spectrum of the social relation (for Kondylis sociology deals with matters of content as they pertain to the social relation; for v. Wiese, the individual social sciences concern themselves with such matters, whereas sociology deals with the aforementioned formal criterion). The relationship between the said formal criterion and psychological factors, as well as the misunderstandings Simmel and v. Wiese lapse into, become the subject of a discussion, which in turn leads to a clarification of the concepts of "nearness" and "distance". The crucial difference between spatial-physical and social nearness and distance (two lovers embracing each other and two enemies fighting each other bare-handed; A might be embracing B passionately while secretly, however, wanting to kill B, etc.), is highlighted, because exactly therein do social-ontological-anthropological categories (forces and factors) of identity and power (in the broadest sense) assume their multifarious ((historical-)sociological) content in the juxtaposition between one's own identity and power and another's identity and power. Thus, "pure sociology's" formal criterion of nearness and distance is transformed into a component of a social ontology. Nearness (proximity) and distance are then also looked at from the point of view of supra-ordination or subordination, as well as from the point of view of for (with) and against. Nearness (proximity) and distance are then also looked at from the point of view of supra-ordination and subordination, as well as from the point of view of For (With) and Against. Kondylis explains how For (With) and Against (or "association - dissociation", "friendship - enmity") as representative of a genus, whose species is supra-ordination and subordination, constitutes a form of a relation containing all the polarity in the entire spectrum of the social relation.

L. v. Wiese is at the centre of attention at the commencement of **Section 2A**. In particular, it is highlighted that v. Wiese, in contemplating notions relating to association and dissociation (nearness and distance), eventually held that (formal) sociology drew its teaching regarding "fellow man" and "anti-man" from "anthropology", i.e. there are always "elementary forces" in man, notwithstanding all the variation in the "historical form of a phenomenon". The result was that v. Wiese breached his own prohibition in respect of connecting forms with content(s): the polarity in the anthropology of drives (e.g. "love" and "hate") now explained the polarity in the spectrum of the social relation. Consequently, the psychological could no longer be clearly separated from the sociological. A social ontology is now one step closer. Kondylis then explains that there are many forms and degrees of nearness and distance, which create the spectrum of the social relation, whose outer limits are extreme nearness and extreme distance. Between the said two extremes (or poles of the social relation's spectrum), however, there is a great variety of forms and degrees of the social relation, which in any event cannot escape from certain anthropological factors or content(s) such as life and death, the most basic, fundamental and protogenic factors of all. Life takes place always at least potentially in view of death, which is irreversible. Life cannot be the criterion of death, since the dead do not know what life means, but death becomes a criterion of life, because the living can imagine (one's own and others') death at any moment. As far as the spectrum of the social relation is concerned, without the anthropological basic fact of death, the spectrum's two poles, i.e. extreme friendship (sacrificing one's life for another or others) and extreme enmity (killing another or others) would cease to exist, and human immortality would have led to vastly different societies. That, however, is not the case. The role of death in defining both extreme enmity and extreme friendship was something acknowledged since ancient and early Christian times, and all polities (and war), as well as action as between citizens without state involvement, have always been characterised by the presence of death at the extremes of the polarity of the social relation. It must be reiterated emphatically that the social relation's polarity does not define the political, as it is part of the social which encompasses the political. Nor does the said polarity have anything to do with any kind of value judgement regarding man. All of historical and social experience attests that humans are all capable of "altruistic" and "egotistical", "friendly" and "inimical" acts. There is no absolute, extra-human measure of "good" and "bad (evil)". Everything humans do is solely within the compass of human action and part of the human condition. Someone who kills is not necessarily "bad (evil)", and someone who loves or dies for another is not necessarily "good". The anthropological fact of death, i.e. man's mortality, and the polarity of the social relation cannot be reduced to psychological factors. The human condition cannot be "improved" in the sense of the (total) effacement of the

inimical or "bad (evil)" pole of the social relation. [On the other hand, social disciplining, in the sense of the ideological (and the attempt at the real) effacement of what is deemed "bad (evil)" necessitates a continual struggle against "evil", regardless of whether a particular content of "evil" has (largely) been or can be overcome in practice, because a new content of "evil" always arises to fill the void, so to speak]. Next, Heidegger's social-ontologically irrelevant, and philosophically-linguistically bloated and ultimately scientifically useless (narcissistically ethicising) ruminations in *Being and Time* regarding, inter alia, death, "authenticity" and "somebody (people or the They)" (German: "Man") are exposed by Kondylis for the "hot air" they constitute, and in the process the so-called "greatest philosopher of the twentieth century" now seems somewhat deflated (there is also a telling reference to one of the truly great Tolstoy's masterpieces: *The death of Ivan Ilyich*). The 20th century saw a number of "marriages" of radicalised theology and antibourgeois cultural critique, and Heidegger added nothing of non-normative, descriptive (empirically and logically consistent) explanatory (i.e. scientific) value (why should "guilt", for instance, belong to the constitution of existence?). The great English thinker, Thomas Hobbes, whilst correctly identifying the drive (urge, impulse or "instinct") of self-preservation and the all-encompassing category of power as non-detachable elements of human existence, could not get past a social-ontologically inadequate naturalistic anthropology to see that symbolic-ideological mechanisms in human societies mean that the ideational need for identity not infrequently leads to action which negates personal physical self-preservation in the name of the common good, collective identity, etc.. The fact and inevitability of death, as well as the possibility of violent death, means that a number of perspectives open up with regard to the founding of the state other than mere Hobbesian fear of other individuals. Social ontology, in order to constitute a science, must apprehend these other perspectives.

Section 2B discusses the social spectrum's polarity as being in principle neutral regarding subjective, psychological or ethical, factors. The kind of the subjective stance or of the psychical act does not necessarily correspond with the kind of the social act, even though the latter must be accompanied by the former. Both association and dissociation can arise because of affective factors, end(goal)-rational (expedient) self-interest, objective reasons, ethical-normative positionings, etc.. Moreover, love and hate both belong to the same affective type of motivation as opposed to the other categories, but have different psychical content, and yet neither necessarily corresponds absolutely to one or the other pole of the social relation [e.g. I kill my enemy out of hate (and or even love) for him and his group as well as love for myself and my group, etc.]. The same psychical content is

(potentially) active at different points of the social relation's spectrum. Social and psychical acts interweave with one another since it is at best extremely difficult to prove causal relations between psychical and social acts when types of motivation and contents of motivation continually mix with one another - and such proof can only be produced on a case by case basis. Psychical disposition may also be asymmetrical in respect of external acts (e.g. too many signs of friendship may provoke disbelief; inimical acts may be overlooked because of long-term self-interest; one may feel personal contempt for a business partner or political friend, respect or admiration for a foe; intense psychical disposition can exist either in the direction of the friendly or inimical pole of the social relation, etc.). Thus, friendship and enmity constitute the decisive criteria for the construction of the social relation's spectrum. Motives, psychical content(s), thought acts are social-ontologically neutral and matters of study for the historian or psychologist in regard to specific circumstances. The formal structure of the social relation's spectrum always remains stable, no matter what the innumerable motives, contents, etc. are on each and every respective occasion. The common association of love with friendship and hate with enmity is not *social-ontologically* significant, in fact it is even misleading. Unlike other animals, humans are never bound by any eternal friendship or eternal enmity (e.g. the disposition of wolf towards lamb), and can often display love (hate) while hating (loving), or love (hate) slightly or deeply while acting more or less intensely, depending on the situation. Friendship and enmity are therefore structurally stable as forms of the relation, but the actual friends and foes (can potentially) interchange continuously in role allocation because they have no substance or essence as friends or foes (cf. *Pantschatantra*). Identity is not a psychological variable but an anthropological constant which, if viewed as an abstraction, is tied to self-preservation before the friend-foe polarity of the social relation becomes active, i.e. an identity never necessarily presupposes fixed friendship or enmity. Identity, which cannot exist without emotions and thoughts, is capable of opposing instinctive preferences and of overcoming the pleasure principle through the principle of reality and power in its (potential) interactions with other identities in any given situation. Neither psychologism, nor the logic of the situation alone adequately explain how an act in a situation is mediated by an interpretation of the situation, which in turn is always connected with the development, modification and maintenance of identity. Wherever the question of self-preservation is posed (= the question of identity, anthropologically and social-ontologically seen), the question of power is also posed, as well as the attendant distinction between friend and foe. Of course, very often, where personal and public relations of power are stable, there is no direct questioning of identity; however, when matters reach extremes, then extreme enmity (the killing of the foe and (the complete rejection of) his or its identity) and extreme friendship (self-sacrifice for one's friends and (the

complete recognition of) their identity) come into play (cf. Aristotle, Cicero). Friendship and enmity do not correspond directly to love and hate or to socialisation (sociality) and lack of socialisation (non-sociality). Society is not created through friendship and destroyed by enmity. Society is the field in which friendship and enmity occur. Morris Ginsberg correctly observed that sociality as such does not distinguish man from beast, but rather man's ability to turn against the will of the group or of the totality of men. Altruism can seek confrontation and enmity when its recipient is under threat. Someone can seek the praise of others, while being indifferent to, or even hating, them (cf. Chamfort, v. Wiese). Nearness and familiarity, just like sociality and socialisation, are neutral vis-à-vis friendship and enmity. Personal nearness and familiarity can lead to both (extreme) friendship and (extreme) enmity, and strangeness by no means necessarily leads to enmity; the examples are innumerable. It is friendship and enmity which determine the nearness or strangeness in any given situation, and not vice versa.

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"The animistic prehistory of the mixing of Is (i.e. Being or To Be) and Ought is discernible here in the angst (or fear) in the face of the magical power of the word and of the curse: whoever expresses something ominous, wishes it

as well, and contributes eo ipso to its carrying out. The defence of the close relation between Is (i.e. Being or To Be) and Ought, as sober and epistemologically well-founded as it may sometimes sound, has always stood under the aegis of this primitive thought style. This ascertainment is not here meant disparagingly; rather, one should conclude from it that exactly in this ascertainment the vitality of that defence, namely its perpetual reference to the constants of the human drive of self-preservation, which inside of culture strive for an objective, that is, taking root in life itself, meaning of life, is seen."

"At the human level, a transformation, through the mediation (or agency) of the "intellect(-spirit)" and its symbolic mechanisms, of the biological magnitude "self-preservation" into an ideational magnitude takes place, so that the question of self-preservation and the, understood in the wider sense, question of power, are transubstantiated into a question of identity" [*Das Politische und der Mensch*, S. 242, referring to *Macht und Entscheidung*, S. 49ff., 80ff..]

Read the book which explains why a final "peace", "concord", "harmony", "reign of justice" or whatever else one may wish to conceptually concoct, will never be realised...

which explains why people, groups of people and the human race in general must struggle or fight to survive, without of course denying the existence of (even long-term, albeit macro-historically always temporary) cooperation, agreement, stability and peace, whilst acknowledging conflict is just as much as cooperation potentially and or actually existent in human interaction in many of its countless manifestations...

which describes and explains the existence of human culture and the mechanisms of power and domination which permeate all kinds of human action from outright violence, which necessarily quantitatively subsides as culture "increases", to in terms of content diverse, yet in terms of form identical, ideational influence, which signals the "development" of human societies. Even the "best" or most "humane" or "altruistic" of human conduct is thoroughly permeated - albeit to varying degrees and in innumerable guises - by power claims and striving for dominance. [The definition of power is all-encompassing and infinitely variable in degrees and forms thereof: life itself, in so far as it continues, is a form of power and extension or expansion of power; power resides as ideas (symbols) AND (potential) deeds, i.e. culture with roots always in

nature (incl. biology), within individuals and groups (tribes, races, nations, institutions, corporations, states, etc.) and pervades all sorts of dynamics and combinations of individuals and groups; the political within the social is the realm within which power manifests itself in various forms through the mediation (or agency) of individual and group actors to bring about some kind of social cohesion and social order]...

which does not tell you what to do or what should be done, the book that does not concern itself with "change" apart from describing and explaining it, the book which explains that normative thought, and of course ideology, are socially necessary (as is the rejection of consistent value-free knowledge), but incapable of adequately describing reality scientifically. Even when the dominant ideology is "settled", read the book which explains the role of interpretation and why there is no "end of history" or "end of conflicts", but which also explains why the promotion of various ideological forms of Utopia (and or mythology) is an inevitable part of relatively "developed" (whether e.g. Aboriginal or advanced-technological) societies and their humans...

which is based entirely on historical fact and not on socially inevitable and indestructible fantasy or illusion, the book which does not try to fool itself and others that replacing one ideology with another ideology (e.g. a "failed traditional grand narrative" with a "micro narrative of harmonious pluralistic co-existence" based on "dialogue" or "universalistic human rights") can possibly constitute any kind of "progress" from a scientific point of view...

Read the book which explains why only strictly descriptive theory (accompanied by a certain perception of human affairs based on (historical) empirical evidence) is capable of explaining human behaviour (action), in all its (historical) variations as well as in its socio-ontological continuity or consistency, to the fullest extent that such behaviour (action) can be explained. The book which exposes why theory is never put into social practice on a mass-scale without being fundamentally altered by the reality of human action and the heterogony of ends...

which draws on the rich history of ideas to illuminate the main theoretical and ideological conflicts in that history with incomparable analytical insight, without of course ever losing sight of the fact that ideas as such do not exist, but only individuals in concrete situations, i.e. only people living in (or in relation to) society exist who make use of ideas in pursuing their own self-

preservation and power claims. Normativism will always prevail at all levels of ideational endeavour, which is always connected to concrete human actors, and the fusion of Is and Ought lies at the basis of all thought which seeks to be socially accepted or influential, from "animism" to the most "complicated and sophisticated" philosophical argumentation.

Read a general theory regarding the militant, polemical character, and the corresponding symbolic functions, of the "intellect(-spirit)"; the role(s) of interpretation, taste and power.

Read the "short" book without footnotes (by Kondylis) which touches upon some of the core elements of Kondylis's thought fully referenced in his two grand projects as exemplified by: *Die Aufklärung im Rahmen des neuzeitlichen Rationalismus* and *Die neuzeitliche Metaphysikkritik* (history of ideas), and, *Das Politische und der Mensch* (social ontology or "macro social theory").

[For the "half-educated" reader (or today's reader tainted by one or many of the various forms of "political correctness"): Kondylis was never a supporter or advocate of Carl Schmitt's decisionistic theory (in actual fact *Power and Decision* is, inter alia, a polemic against Schmitt's decisionism in favour of a "descriptive theory of the decision")*. Decisionism, or variations of it, or forms of existentialism that have used the concept of the decision (and or the friend-foe concept) have had various advocates at different historical moments and such thinkers were by no means of the same or similar political persuasions (e.g. as Kondylis himself has pointed out, Karl Jaspers and Karl Barth were not exactly outspoken supporters of national socialism, and it goes without saying that Kierkegaard (and also Nietzsche) lived in times pre-dating 20th century politics post World War I). Labeling thinkers and people in general based on a superficial understanding of their writings and positions is understandable if what is sought is polemical confrontation and ("final") ideological victory - it has, however, absolutely nothing to do with value-free (i.e. non-normative) description and explanation or analysis. Just as Kondylis acknowledged the extent to which slightly significant thinkers like Schmitt (Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck as exponents of the science of history were far greater influences on Kondylis than Schmitt), and extremely significant thinkers like Karl Marx were correct, he did not hesitate to point out their considerable shortcomings as well.

* Essential reading for a fuller understanding of Kondylis's stance in relation to Schmitt and decisionism, including in the context of the law, theology and political rule (sovereignty, domination or power), and also regarding the question of value freedom, with telling references to Kelsen, Bonald, Donoso Cortés, A. l' Houet, is: Kondylis, P. "Jurisprudenz, Ausnahmezustand

und Entscheidung. Grundsätzliche Bemerkungen zu Carl Schmitts "Politische Theologie"", esp. pp. 343-344, 350-351, 352ff (pp. 154-156, 166-169, 170ff. in the Greek text: «Επιλεγόμενα» (στην Πολιτική Θεολογία του Carl Schmitt))]

READ "the book"... "the dynamite under the delusions of philosophers and theorists in general hardly anyone wants to touch" (C. F.).

TRANSLATOR'S HINT TO BEMUSED READERS: Whilst whatever I say cannot be a substitute for the hard work needed to read and understand Kondylis, the following may be of assistance: one of the points made in *Power and Decision* is that every kind of society creates its own ideologies and ruling dogmas, which all have a common conceptual structure, through and behind which concrete individuals and groups exercise power, i.e. influence and or govern others, and thus have differing and opposing thought content. In the Western context, the ruling dogma or ideology once said e.g. that the Son of God was God and born of a mortal Virgin. To openly doubt such absurdity would be punished harshly. Today, in certain sectors of society, "rape has nothing to do with sex", "everyone (i.e. individuals from all over the world as compared to one another, and not individuals of the human race as compared to other non-human species of the animal kingdom or natural world) is the same", "women and men are equal" (even though their hitherto unchangeable biological differences as biology without human intervention are not exactly hidden and unknown - even to laypeople), "x race is inherently "good" compared to y race which has a history of inherent "evil" (even though race, however defined, does not really exist, whereas racism does)", "human rights exist notwithstanding that they are not enforced in respect of all humans everywhere (or are enforced only selectively on the basis of power politics)", "love and open borders will overcome hate and division", "even though humans are natural beings, human culture is totally separable from nature", "Islam is the religion of Peace [and only Peace]", or the once prominent: "people (i.e. humans) of x race are sub-human or not human", "Christianity is the religion of Love [and only Love]", etc., despite being such logically inconsistent (not to say ridiculous and ludicrous) statements or notions with no empirical foundation whatsoever, are nonetheless (blindly) believed and supported with zeal and fanaticism by (both relatively intelligent as well as mentally challenged if not retarded) people. Inevitably, such people, riding the high tide of polemics, emotion and sloganeering, will do everything within their means to sideline any doubters so that certain individuals and groups can wield power over other individuals and groups, i.e. the polemical zeal behind power claims overrides any logical coherence and correspondence with empirical reality. Thus, without supporting any dogma or ideology, i.e. thought content, what *Power and Decision* does is describe the basic thought forms through which human (social) action takes place, with an emphasis on world images, world views, ideologies, as they pertain to self-preservation, power, the intellect(-spirit), identity, meaning, etc. (*The Political and Man* (*Das Politische und der Mensch*) gives readers a more rounded and far deeper view of human (social) action, encompassing: 1) the social relation both as to its (friend-foe) spectrum, and as to its mechanism (understanding, rationality, language), which bring about the endless types of (historical-)sociological content; 2) the

political as the interaction of all interactions achieving social coherence and social order (social disciplining); and 3) the anthropological, whereby human nature is culture, with humans always being *both* natural and cultural beings, no matter how much culture can shape and control, rule or change nature) [neither Hobbes, nor Rousseau are absolutely right about human nature as far as "good" or "evil" is concerned; or, both are only partially right - both their positions are encompassed by empirically observed human action throughout known history].

A note on terminology

“Power” („Macht“) is (human) life and (human) life’s continuation (self-preservation) in human culture (society), i.e. (restricted by and) relative to other (individual and collective) crystallisations of (forms of) power, as well as, in its broadest sense, encompassing all forms of the (in part overlapping in meaning) terms: dominance, predominance, domination, rule, ruling (over others), authority, sovereignty, dominion, control, influence, etc.. Power and all its aforementioned manifestations can be physical and or (more often) ideational (ideological), and ultimately always refers to (human) society (and its culture, and the multifarious manifestations of identity, of individuals and groups) as the (a) political (collective) with some form of social order and social cohesion (as well as social disciplining)°.

There is usually no necessarily strict and absolute distinction made between the terms (with the notable exception of „Gewalt“ as "violence"):

„Herrschaft“, which is usually translated as “dominance” and far less commonly as “domination” or “rule” (“ruling (over others)”) [Talcott Parsons’s translation is mainly "authority", though "domination" is also used not infrequently, and Parsons observed that whilst there was no satisfactory English equivalent for the term „Herrschaft“, "imperative control" as used by N. S. Timasheff was nonetheless closest to Weber's meaning (see Weber Max, *Economy and Society*, Vol. 1., pp. 61-62, note 31, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1968, 1978; see also: pp. 217ff. („legale Herrschaft“ = "legal authority"), 226ff. („traditionale Herrschaft“ = "traditional authority"), 241ff. („charismatische Herrschaft“ = "charismatic authority"), 262ff. („Herrschaft“ = "authority"), etc. - elsewhere in the same edition of *Economy and Society*, as already noted, „Herrschaft“ is translated as "domination" (pp. 53ff., 212ff.) or as "legitimate domination" (p. 212ff.); "legitimer Herrschaft" is translated as "authority" (p. 215ff.), etc. Kondylis's own Greek rendering of „Herrschaft“ as «ἐξουσία» suggests the English word "authority" (or even "power", "control", "dominion", "governance") rather than "dominance" or "domination". The translator's view is that "authority" in English does not adequately convey a sense of the relatively high degree of "power" or "imperative control" contained within „Herrschaft“ and «ἐξουσία» (keeping in mind as well the diminution and or dispersal in the force of actual (top-down) "authority" in the West in the decades since Parsons was intellectually active), and therefore has opted for "dominance" ("domination" or "rule"/"ruling (over others)"). This is not to say that "authority" is not a valid, or even the better, choice.];

„Beherrschung“ as “domination” or “control(ling)”;
„Vorherrschaft“ as “predominance”;
„Gewalt“ as "violence";
„Kraft“ as "force" or "strength", and less often "power";
„Autorität“, „Instanz“ as “authority”;
„Durchsetzung“ as “imposition” or “predominance” or “prevailing”;
„Souveränität“ as “sovereignty”;
„Gebiet“ can be defined as “dominion”, though more often as “field”, “area”, “sector”;
„gebietend“ as “commanding”;
„Einfluß“, and less often „Wirkung“ (primarily “effect”), as “influence”;
and so on, and so forth...

The translator is not in principle opposed to the making of strict(er) definitional distinctions between the above-mentioned terms, however, due to the degree in the overlapping of such terms' meaning, neither Kondylis nor the translator has engaged in such an endeavour. Definitional distinctions are important. They cannot or should not however constrain the relative elasticity of meaning when exactly such flexibility is epistemologically appropriate. The fact that some non-human animals can and do exercise some forms of power over other animals not necessarily through direct physical contact or violence, and can control their impulses or instincts to some degree in certain circumstances, does not alter the fact that the non-human animals as social animals which display such self-control, do not behave („verhalten“) in a way which could encompass human-like action (acting, act(s)) („Handeln“, "Handlung", „Akt(e)“)°° accompanied by a symbolic network or "system" of meaning (language etc.) created by humans beyond what pre-existed, or exists without human intervention, in the natural world. Furthermore, terms such as:

„Weltbild“ ("world image"),
„Weltanschauung“, „Weltansicht“ ("world view") or „weltanschaulich“ ("world-theoretical"),
„Weltauffassung“ ("perception of the world" or "world view"),
„Ideologie“ ("ideology"),
„falsches Bewußtsein“ ("false consciousness"),
„Religion“ ("religion"),

and,

„Interaktion“ ("interaction"),

„Wechselwirkung“ ("interaction (or mutual influence)")

have more or less overlapping but also context-specific meanings e.g. when defined strictly or more broadly, etc.; by no means are they always meant totally mutually exclusively.

° Unfortunately for English-language readers there is no English translation yet of the following compelling article discussing "power" and "dominance/domination/rule/ruling (over others)" (or "authority") (Petrides Raymond, ""Power" and "Authority" in the late work of P. Kondylis" in *Νέος Ερμής ο Λόγιος* (*Neos Hermes ho Logios*), Έτος (Year) 4, Τεύχος (Issue) 10, Καλοκαίρι (Summer) 2014, Αθήνα (Athens), Εταιρεία Μελέτης Ελληνικού Πολιτισμού (www.emep.gr), pp. 118-162):



[Πετρίδης Ρεϋμόνδος «Ισχύς» και «Εξουσία» στο όψιμο έργο του Π. Κονδύλη.pdf](#)

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°° The distinction between animal *behaviour* and human *action* (*acting*, *act(s)*) is useful when making certain comparisons, but the terms are also interchangeable, depending on the context.

POWER AND DECISION (MACHT UND ENTSCHEIDUNG) by Panajotis Kondylis - alternative words and phrases version with some German text



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SCIENCE, POWER AND DECISION by Panagiotis Kondylis - plain English version (see bottom of this page for the "alternative words and phrases" version including some German text)



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Read the article in English which in a hitherto unknown manner outlines the extent we can know, including knowing about all forms of knowing, without a hint of ideological bias or of weakness as to facts, i.e. empirical reality, and without becoming lost in labyrinths of bombastic and pointless words focussing on minutiae and ultimately, from a practical point of view, irrelevant matters. One could read countless thousands of pages written by the "greatest philosophers and thinkers" (including the literally tonnes of nonsense produced by fashionable intellectuals-ideologues in recent decades), particularly in the field of epistemology (the theory of knowledge), and not come anywhere near to the clarity and certainty of knowledge contained within the 20 or so pages of Kondylis's German text (to be fair to great thinkers of the past such as Hobbes, Locke, Descartes, Spinoza (and many others) the various polemical needs of their times - i.e. the various polemics of new-times philosophical stances with reference to ancient-Christian metaphysics and the hierarchisation of being, or, the steady replacement of the primacy of ontology by the primacy of epistemology - were not something with which Kondylis directly engaged in formulating his own theories, rather Kondylis wrote the broad history of those needs and the attempts to satisfy them in his magisterial *The Enlightenment in the framework of new-times rationalism* and *The new-times critique of metaphysics*; moreover, Kondylis makes it clear in "Science, Power and Decision" he is dealing with theoretical activity in

general, i.e. explanations of natural and social phenomena, and not how we know within the restrictive prism or dichotomy of e.g. empiricism vs. rationalism, which, at least in part, arises from the aforementioned historical polemics (in the "Foreword" to *Power and Decision* Kondylis calls his theory "a theory of human action and of the function of the intellectual(-spiritual) dimension in it").

In any event, apart from logical consistency and correspondence with empirical reality, what makes "Science, Power and Decision" and all of Kondylis's work stand out is that he does not tell his readers what to do or what "should" be done (notwithstanding the fact that any and every claim to knowledge constitutes a power-claim and is historically determined and relative, including Kondylis's claims to knowledge). There is no (ethical-)normative dimension, and in this sense Kondylis's work is scientific or value-free (given logical consistency and confirmation by empirical reality, as well as of course the acknowledgement of the limits to knowledge). Knowledge *is* power, but not in any socially meaningful sense for the absolutely consistent (social or natural) scientist (or as Kondylis preferred to put it in respect of the social scientist, "observer of human affairs"), whose task is not to change, but to contemplate (consider, observe) and explain. Kondylis is the first and only known "philosopher" who has systematically claimed or shown across several thousand pages of his own written work, regardless of what the main focus of his attention is at any given time, that a) there can be certainty of knowledge (to the extent it is possible) and regardless of its necessary perspectivity and historicity, while b) values are relative, and that the relativity of values and associated normative power claims always have more to say in terms of driving social action than the possibility of knowing what is, particularly to the full extent that knowledge is possible (in other words, all world images or positions or theories are historically determined, but they are not all relative or subjective if one accepts some level of certainty of objective knowledge which is verified empirically - insisting that all positions are relative (as to facts), logically contradicts itself because the insistence (that all positions are relative as to facts) is itself a truth claim with supposed reference to empirical reality).

For readers who can manage to read German, an excellent article outlining some of Kondylis's basic positions whilst rebutting post-modern ideological prejudice, e.g. ethically-charged and emotional accusations of "fundamentalism" just because Kondylis never bowed to any ideological programme, including post-modern mass-democratic social theory, is:

Konstantin Verykios: Wissenschaftliche Wahrheitssuche bei Panajotis Kondylis.
In: IABLIS. Jahrbuch für europäische Prozesse, 12. Jg., 2013
http://www.iablis.de/iablis_t/2013/verykios13.html

(Inter alia, the important point is made by Verykios that M. Weber in reference to "value rationality" meant value as an ethical or religious value; hence, the misunderstandings over the term "value-free" etc.).

Also illuminating as to the question of Kondylis's methodological outlook is K. Verykios's article:

Konstantin Verykios: Erkenntnistheoretische Einsichten und methodisches Vorgehen –
Clausewitz und Kondylis, IABLIS Jahrbuch für europäische Prozesse 13. Jg. 2014
<https://themen.iablis.de/2014/verykios14.html>

SCIENCE, POWER AND DECISION (Wissenschaft, Macht und Entscheidung) by Panajotis Kondylis - alternative words and phrases version with some German text



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Planetary Politics after the Cold War by Panagiotis Kondylis: plain English Version



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"One will certainly scandalise our ethicists (that means: the ideologues of *our (own)* society), if one ascertains as a sociologist that in [human rights] universalism both social atomisation (i.e. the breaking up or fragmentation of society into individuals), which is indispensable for the highly developed (advanced) division of labour against the background of unlimited mobility, as well as the democratic claim of material equality, are reflected ideologically".

"Ethical-normative ideas are not made up in order to be taken (or understood) and to be realised at face value, but in order to constitute an identity and to be used as weapons of this identity in the struggle against other identities. Whoever cannot understand that will also not be able to ever comprehend either ethical-normative ideas' internal intellectual (thought) structure nor their external historical effect".

One of the fundamental insights Kondylis shares with his readers in *Planetary Politics after the Cold War* is that all societies, including our own, justify, beautify or propagandise concrete power relations by means of ideological embellishment, lies and deceit. A descriptive and analytical or explanatory (i.e. value-

free) consideration of the way international affairs have taken place, do take place and will possibly take place as a broad outline of what has occurred, is occurring and what might occur as form (or structure) and possibility (not as content and event), is what Kondylis's short book provides, *inter alia*, to its readers.

Whether the dominant ideology is "love thy neighbour", "the survival of the fittest" and racial "superiority", "proletarian internationalism", "human rights" universalism or being "tolerant" of, and "understanding", others' values and perspectives, etc., the basic modes of action of individual and collective subjects remain the same: power claims and the struggle for self-preservation, striving for power and power's expansion; the viewing of, and acting in relation to, other subjects on the basis of the friend-foe spectrum, including the most blatant abuse of one's own stated "principles" in order to further one's own interests (e.g. the USA's openly selective "enforcement" of "human rights" and turning a blind eye to its allies' and its own flagrant "human rights" abuses, or the Soviet Union's, China's or other communistic movements' at times highly nationalistic, or at any rate statist, interpretation of "proletarian internationalism"). In other words, the instrumentalisation (by concrete (individual and collective) social actors) of ideological programmes is the norm, and only propagandists or the utterly naive (or stupid) could possibly believe otherwise (whilst ideas do not reflect reality in any vulgar Marxist or simplistic mechanical sense, they do not exist without some ultimate reference to

concrete individuals, groups, and social action, i.e. when they take ideological-political form they can or do reflect (aspects of) concrete social relations, and at the very least their bearers' striving for power).

Apart from giving readers a basic understanding of how the international system operates (on the basis of small, middle and major, great and planetary (or world) Powers with the interspersed (between these just mentioned main groups of Powers) subgroups of subordinate, local, regional or supraregional, colonial, economic and or military, and or leading Powers, even though at the time of writing the book only one great or leading Power, the USA, was also a planetary Power in the full sense of the term), including with regard to these Powers' relations with one another as (sovereign) states (e.g. as subjects and objects of planetary politics) and with regard to the (possible) formation of large spaces or spheres of influence, i.e. various forms of unfolding spaces and correlations of forces), *Planetary Politics after the Cold War* also gives readers an understanding of the potential advent of planetary or at least regional anomie (where it does not already exist) because of the planetarisation of, and many variations on, Western mass democracy, with its hedonistic mass consumption flowing from mass production, the advanced division of labour and distinctly mass-democratic material interpretation of the formal legal rights characteristic of the bourgeois liberal and European colonialistic era. Kondylis never shies away from drawing ultimate conclusions from the driving forces at work, no matter how nightmarish *possible* future scenarios might turn out

to be: as in the case of the biologisation of the political and the pitting of man against man in conditions of generalised anomie arising from the population explosion, a possible breakdown of sovereign statehood and the uncontrolled migrations of the peoples.

Furthermore, while always keeping in mind the social-historical character of all things human, e.g. how the world has reached the mass-democratic planetary era as a result of European colonial expansion, the Liberal and Industrial Revolution, European liberalism, capitalism and imperialism, national and international massification and (extreme) atomisation, the transition from closed oligarchies and fixed hierarchies to the game of the open elite and (unlimited) social mobility (the leveling of hierarchies and of authorities) with increasing individualism, egalitarianism, value pluralism and permissiveness, i.e. the process of democratisation, the legal (not actual) equality of collective (i.e. state) subjects coming about in the twentieth century, the role of economic modernisation and economic growth, along with democratisation and the economisation of the political as defence mechanisms against the anomie latent in massification etc., a thorough introduction to basic political and sociological concepts is given, including such crucial matters as the distinction between estate-based society, oligarchic liberal capitalism and social or mass democracy (including its "devious" variants of communism and fascism). In particular, the contribution of communism (with its (ideological and real) promotion of international and national legal

and material equality) in the 20th century to the formation and planetarisation of mass democracy (with its at times relatively "not so brutal" (over many decades commencing during nineteenth century mass society, predating its mass-democratic phase in which inter alia everyday life is mechanised and the worker also becomes a consumer on a mass scale, especially after World War Two) and at other times relatively "brutal" (e.g. within two or three decades in the 20th century) undermining and destruction of the vestiges of pre-industrial, patriarchal and stricter hierarchical group-based social formations and culture) is potently conveyed to the reader. Kondylis makes it clear that while nations [a nation being, inter alia, a collective subject with an (at least partially) shared collective consciousness based on myth and or historical reality with often some degree of commonality as to race or ethnological background, (and or) language, (and or) religion, (and or) customs or practices, (and or) legal system, (and or) ideology, etc.] and states can come about, but not exclusively in the case of nations, as new creations based on political decisions and actions; peoples, races, cultures, civilisations and or certain nations can exist for (very) many centuries (as evolving entities with elements of continuity and elements of change) and do not appear out of nowhere (i.e. historical and social reality does not fit into simplistic dogmatic categorisations as promoted by both "nationalists" on the "Right" and "internationalists" on the "Left"). There are also sections on radicalised traditionalisms and or nationalisms or regionalisms and modernisation (which definitely puts for instance

the outbreak of "Islamic fundamentalism" into an illuminating social-historical perspective), as well as on the new shape of hot war, with particular emphasis on the effect of the end of the US-Soviet nuclear standoff, the diffusion of (new) weapons technologies and the possible variable consequences on smaller and greater Powers, the unlikelihood of "total" war, conceptual clarification of both "total" war and "war of annihilation", and the advent of other forms of war in the planetary era including the possible interweaving of war violence with criminal violence within the framework of widespread (worldwide) anomie.

As is the case with all of Kondylis's works, the insightfulness of his thinking, the implications of his conclusions and the uniqueness of his analytical consistency (e.g. his observations that "liberal democracy" and "human rights" have never existed, and do not exist, as *scientifically* defined terms and social phenomena (social facts) (likewise, "conservatism", as with "liberalism", has only a present-day mass-democratic polemical-political use; scientifically (descriptively and explanatorily), real-world historical-sociological changes have rendered terms such as "conservatism", "liberalism"[, and "democracy" as polity,] obsolete as regards their present-day application); his view of the Stalinistic five-stage schema of the course of History as being something much more ideologically substantial than mere dogmatic stubbornness; the observation that the original communistic ideal of a classless society was actually realised as a caricature (thanks to the heterogony of ends) in Western mass democracies°;

or the scientific validity of the interaction between (the anthropological and socio-ontological magnitudes of) power relations (social and political relations), action and the concrete situation and not a priori value-based conceptions, or confessions of faith in particular views, of History, Man, economics, class, gender, race, democracy, etc.), make *Planetary Politics after the Cold War* another stunning contribution to the social and political sciences worthy of the great thinkers (notwithstanding the serious shortcomings in some of these thinkers' work) who preceded him: from Thucydides and Aristotle to Hobbes, from Machiavelli to Pareto and Weber, from Spinoza and Kant to Marx and Mannheim, from Clausewitz to Aron, to mention only a few such men in the extremely rich Western tradition of thought.

° The translator adds that the Frankfurt School and "cultural Marxism" can be seen at least in part as representing an "ideological vanguard" and justification of Western mass democracy (under American imperialism) as caricature of communism.

Also of interest:

Kondylis Panagiotis: "'Human Rights': Conceptual Confusion and Political Exploitation", translated from the Greek by Stephen Stafford and Raymond Petridis.

In: Telos. Critical Theory of the Contemporary, no. 166, Spring 2014, pp. 161-165;
doi: 10.3817/0314166161

(<http://journal.telospress.com/content/2014/166/161.extract>)

and,

"Panajotis Kondylis and the Obsolescence of Conservatism" by Paul Gottfried, in *Modern Age*, Fall 1997, pp. 403-418 - PDF <http://www.unz.org/Pub/ModernAge-1997q4-00403>

(Paul E. Gottfried, who cites Kondylis in both *After liberalism: Mass Democracy in the managerial state*, PUP, New Jersey, 1999, and, *Conservatism in America. Making Sense of the American Right*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2007, in his charming partisan-political manner, inaccurately associates Kondylis with Marxism, anti-Americanism and even conservatism itself rather than being a value-free or value-neutral (i.e. descriptive, explanatory and non-normative/non-partisan) observer of the social facts/phenomena of conservatism (liberalism and mass democracy), communism (and Marxism, including its very important social-scientifically valid aspects, as well as noting its inanities), American "human rights" imperialism, etc.).

A further example of misrepresenting Kondylis as “anti-American” (what is not understood is that a non-normativistic “value-free” or “axiologically free” position makes one “anti” everything that normatively (ethically) goes beyond dispassionate description and explanation; only those who have a normatively inspired side to defend, e.g. “the American philosophical tradition”, “hopes” of the coming of a (pragmatistic) “Third Enlightenment” in “democratic societies” (!), or actual American imperialism dressed up in naivety (“universalisable human rights” can only be realised by a world state (i.e. power politics as domination on the grandest of scales – something not very likely...), will find in a mere observer of human affairs an “anti-American”), is: Weber, Eric Thomas, “The Third Enlightenment as American: A Reply to Kondylis,” *Skepsis*, Volume 21, Issue 2, 2011, p. 97-107 (https://www.academia.edu/3000358/The_Third_Enlightenment_as_American_A_Reply_to_Kondylis). (It goes without saying that Kondylis's history of the *European Enlightenment* ends with Kant, C. Wolff, Lessing, Herder, Hegel, Schelling, Fichte, Hölderlin,... who were all born at least about 70 years before the American pragmatists: C. S. Peirce, W. James, J. Dewey, who are nonetheless referred to in *The Political and Man* and/or *The new-times critique of metaphysics*).

Planetary Politics after the Cold War (Planetarische Politik nach dem Kalten Krieg) by Panajotis Kondylis: alternative words and phrases version with some German text



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"The German "special way (Sonderweg or exceptionalism)" and German prospects (perspectives)" by Panagiotis Kondylis



[The German »special way« and German prospects.pdf](#)

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"One more likely feels guilty in Tuscany or in Alsace than as a welfare recipient".

"The monsters of today have often become the gods of tomorrow, yesterday's atrocities, today's models".

One of Kondylis's most enthralling articles, "The German "special way" and German prospects", is an excellent example of how a historical value-free, i.e. descriptive and non-normative, approach is capable of shedding light on a concept that has been inundated by all kinds of emotionalism, parochialism and sheer narrow-mindedness, if not downright stupidity and overt racism. The different meanings and interpretations of the German "special way" are contrasted to social-historical reality, so that it becomes clear that from a *strictly scientific point of*

view even such a maligned phenomenon as Nazism is nothing more and nothing less than a facet of *human, social* action tied to a particular time and place with a particular history, just like all the various manifestations of despotism, democracy and all other polities. It is not the task of the social scientist to regurgitate popular misconceptions or to disseminate blatant lies based e.g. on the level or amount of crudely racist propaganda and quantity of atrocities under the Nazi regime when, after all, the qualitative attributes of such racism and violent acts have been recurring in much, if not all, of human history, and the quantity, mutatis mutandis, of the said "abnormalities" or abominations have, in any event, not been infrequent since time immemorial, in addition to being the product of perpetrators with all kinds of racial, ethnological, political, religious and other backgrounds. The task of social science is to understand what has happened, what is happening and what might happen, including the rise and fall of nations, ideologies, forms of government etc. in the directly relevant social and historical framework of the specific era in question without recourse to simplistic "explanations" which reflect (present-day) ideological preferences and concrete interests of concrete collective subjects. What humans do with, and to, other humans is part of human (i.e. social) action - there is no "good" or "evil" outside of what is (either in peacetime or in wartime) human and human striving for power, i.e. survival, meaning, identity, dominance.

The article reaches its climax with a typical Kondylian surprise. An explanation never expressed

before is given of the paradox of post-World War Two German affluence co-existing with the ideological "mea culpa" of the negative version of the "special way". A "mea culpa" or highly ideological "collective guilt" arising in the era after National Socialism which costs very little materially and functions to instil social conformism and give the parameters of the rhetoric of the elites and those amongst the masses who seek to climb into elite circles, as well as to psychologically satisfy a nation then living under the "luxury" of geopolitical patronage and in a mass-democratic state of consumerist and lifestyle euphoria - which is bound to end as soon as Germany has to face a future when affluence is no longer a "right" for masses of its people or if e.g. the balance of power between nations becomes seriously unhinged and or triggers efforts at major readjustment. No social phenomenon is ethical per se. Rather the individual and collective subjects who as part of society are made by, and make, social phenomena, ethicise their power claims as part of social interaction. Once there is no need for a particular version of the "special way", another "special way" or "special ways" will come to the fore, or simply another way of ideologically explaining things will take over. Reality's portrayal is thus always at the ideological behest of social actors striving for power, and the reality of ideology is the concealment and or distortion of the full picture of what is real, to the extent that full picture is knowable, in favour of (what are perceived as) particular interests.

[*Konservativismus* (IV, 1(d), p. 423ff. (esp. pp.425-428)) also contains an invaluable discussion of the simply incorrect attribution of Germany's role in the World Wars to "reaction" and a supposed lack of development of e.g. "parliamentary liberalism" or "democracy" when, inter alia, Europe's second most industrially productive nation with the largest social-democratic workers' movement, and a comparable rule of law and bourgeois freedoms, was excluded from the Anglo-Gallic "parliamentary-liberal" imperialistic carving up of the world (cf. loc. cit., pp. 469-475, 481-482)].

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Panagiotis Kondylis - Answers to 28 questions



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"... a society of people cannot live in a state of permanent war without disintegrating, simultaneously however, it cannot help constantly giving birth to conflict from its womb (bloody or not). Friendship and peace are in respect of the *situation humaine* just as little to be disregarded as enmity and struggle (war). We are not dealing here with a matter of faith, but a banal truth which is to be learnt just

from reading the daily newspapers. Whoever cannot admit and digest that, may be a great prophet or, shall we say, a great philosopher (or social theorist) - he is not suitable as an analyst of human affairs".

"The fusion of strict conceptual processing (elaboration) and profound historical analysis, with a first-hand knowledge of real facts, constitutes for me not merely a methodological ideal, but an elementary prerequisite of a positioning which wants to be taken seriously, which has, i.e., the ambition and the possibility of offering its studier an essential knowledge of the world in which he lives. The production of ahistorical and unhistorical theory is basically an easy matter, and that is why so many, famous and unknown or little-known theorists, indulge in it, wanting to believe that the substitution of an arbitrary concept with another arbitrary concept, or a new combination of concepts, is an important contribution to thought. All of that constitutes symptoms of a permanent intellectual(-spiritual) adolescence. The intellect(-spirit) reaches its maturity when it is in a position to give a concrete analysis of a concrete situation. Only the clueless will call that narrowness and empiricism. Because precisely the concrete analysis of concrete situations shows the true texture and usefulness of conceptual and methodological tools".

Undoubtedly, the best introduction to Kondylis's thought are his answers to questions put to him by three different interviewers. In these answers the reader will find outlines of some of the key themes in

the work of this unique "observer of human affairs", including as regards his conception of social ontology; the distinction between Is and Ought; the relationship between scientific knowledge and method; the confusion arising between scepticism and Platonism which overshadows much of historical philosophical discourse; the distinctive features of the European New Times and its coming to an end; human rights as propaganda and not as reality; thoughts on Schmitt, Spengler, Fukuyama, Huntington et al.; references to Kondylis's own intellectual development and life; as well as touching tributes to Spinoza, Marx and Weber.

Note: most of the words or phrases in parantheses in the translations are the translator's alternative choices in English, and the reader should not view them as part of Kondylis's discursive style in either German or Greek.

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"Every position comes into being as a counterposition".

"The life of humans is given meaning only by their acts".

"Whatever benefits the self-serving is propagandised by the naive".

"There is no final solution and there is no happiness that is not in danger".

"Postmodern mash is easily digested but it does not constitute nutritious food".

"Only intellectuals contend that intellectuals understand the world better than others".

"The only thing that a world state could guarantee is the conversion of all wars into civil wars".

"Pluralism is the ideology of satiated felicity – the hungry do not respect the values of the satiated".

"In relation to the distribution of goods one is less generous than in relation to the exchange of information".

"Whoever contends that History has ended might as well be certain that History awaits him around the next corner".

"A claim to absolute dominance however consists precisely in demanding from one's foe that he shares our self-understanding".

"Most people consider it roughly unnatural for other opposing viewpoints to prevail. I, on the contrary, am surprised when someone agrees with me".

"Because the first thing that a theory, which wants to be scientific, must offer, is an explanation exactly of those phenomena which prima facie contradict it".

"The proclamation of human rights today is connected with - and in the future it will be connected even more closely - with the once explicit desire that one's dear fellow man should sit in his own country and enjoy his human dignity over there".

"[the philosophers'] position is in part tragic and in part comical because they themselves cannot transubstantiate... power into their own social domination and, correspondingly, they dream that rulers will one day philosophise rather than philosophers prevail".

"Speaking in jest, I confess to friends that, since reading pleases me so much, I should have never made writing my profession, and I recollect with envy Lord

Henry in "The Portrait of Dorian Gray", who said that he likes reading so much that it does not give him any motive to write books himself".

"Something which for someone is the future of humanity, can for someone else be the neighbourhood bakerwoman; and whilst someone who at the level of values promotes humanity and its felicitous future but in reality lives for his bank account, someone else can commit murder or suicide on account of the neighbourhood bakerwoman".

"Humans will be called "humans", precisely like lions are called lions and mice - mice, without any other ethnic, national or ideological differentiation. It might appear to be a paradox, but it is true that a human separated himself from all the other animal species precisely because he was not only a human without any other predicate".

"ultimate, not further reducible, reality consists of existences, individuals or groups, which struggle for their self-preservation and, together with that of necessity also for the extension of their power, that is why they meet as friends or foes and change friends or foes according to the needs of the striving after self-preservation and striving after [the extension of their] power".

"If the same Western Powers, which in 1919 dismissed Japan's request and did not want to enshrine the equality of races in the Treaty of Versailles, in 1996 try hard to achieve understanding of foreign cultures, this does not necessarily mean that progress in understanding has occurred. However, it does indicate a dramatic shift in the (world) balance of power".

"The de-ideologisation and the merging of politics with the economy, in the final analysis, mean that in the future conflicts will be conducted for tangible material goods, without notable ideological mediations. Thus, to be precise, we should characterise the end of ideologies as a partial return to the animal kingdom. Whether it is attractive and desirable for the farewelling of Utopia to reach up to there will remain a matter of taste".

"Just as the philosopher [Kant] believed, it is exactly the "mixing" and "merging" of peoples which puts peace in danger. But even if the democratic peoples remained separate like good neighbours, as Kant preferred, again they would not be lacking

in war-mongering arguments in the event they are needed. Nobody will deny the principle that "democracies do not wage war against each other" - only that he will add that the opponent is not a "genuine democrat"".

"... think historically, the answers to historical problems are not found in constructed theory, but on the contrary, the answers to theoretical problems are found in history. Those who choose theory over history do it not because they move in higher spheres, as they themselves often think, but out of intellectual(-spiritual) indolence; because any theory whatsoever is infinitely more simple than any historical situation whatsoever".

"just as conservatives have never satisfactorily been able to explain how revolutionaries were capable of unhinging (or turning upside down) an entire "natural" or even "divine" order, and consequently prove themselves to be stronger than this entire "natural" or "divine" order, so too the revolutionary natural law advocates have hitherto not given a convincing answer to the question as to how nature's commands could be infringed so persistently by suppression, violence or alienation".

"In order to avoid hysteria in the face of full and irrevocable death, the hysteria of eschatology was legitimised world-theoretically. Whoever learns to live without express and tacit eschatologies and without ethicisms as these eschatologies' substitutes, should also learn to die, totally and irrevocably, with serenity and cheerfulness (of the soul). If one can be taught this supreme lesson somewhere, it is from classical antiquity, which ignored the straight line with the auspicious endpoint in order to fix itself on the observing and the living of the eternal cycle".

"...however a substantial contribution to the knowledge of human affairs requires a total existential commitment, the vigilant observation of concrete situations of living people, and an unstoppable distillation of observations with relentless reflection, which does not retreat before any bias and does not fear clashing with anyone and anything. One could call this stance an ethic (it is certainly a form of internal

asceticism), however it does not have any relation with ethics as a norm of social behaviour; on the contrary, it can conflict head on with such a norm".

"The actual events in history are acted out, nonetheless, beyond the polemical slogans, even though the preachers and users of these slogans believe in a necessary relation between themselves and the historical becoming. On the other hand however, this [historical] becoming is promoted exactly by those forces (power or energies) which set the polemical slogans free. In this respect, a condition of effective historical action consists in that one does not know what one is doing - and also, that one theoreticises this ignorance of his with all argumentative arts (or skills)".

"Of course, the garrulous and lachrymose pseudo-humanism that characterises public discourse in the West does not mean any tangible disposition for drastic world-wide redistribution of material prosperity. On the other hand, the extremely dangerous paradox of the planetary situation means that even "just" solutions such as self-denial without historical precedent would not offer a long-term way out. If the wealth e.g. of 800 million is divided amongst six billion, everyone will simply become a brother in poverty – conversely: if a Chinese, Indian and African were to consume per capita as much raw material and as much energy as a North American, that could entail ecological collapse".

".... Also on this point, of course, there is no gain in knowledge, but a rectilinear return to the thoughts world (or ideological universe) of early liberalism. Because the world-historical perspective of a permanent replacement of war with trade was founded already in the 18th century through the assumption that only calculus (i.e. calculation) directed by interests, whose prototype lies in economic activity, by virtue of this assumption, disciplines the "passions", which exactly leave (or have nothing to do with) the concept of (self-)interest, and consequently

rationalises (i.e. organises or systematises) social behaviour in its entirety.
We know what has happened since the 18th century".

"If value-freedom could be described at all as a value, then this would only be possible in the methodological (not ethical) sense, and only with regard to the activity of science – of course if, and in so far, it can be empirically proven that value-free science is cognitively the most fertile....whereas, however, psychological and moral stances are connected of necessity with certain content, which turns against other content (e.g. tolerance against intolerance), value freedom constitutes a method which must be free of a certain psychological content, exactly because it makes the claim of understanding all psychological and all moral contents and alternatively of being able to adopt (or appropriate) those contents. On the basis of the principle of value freedom, it cannot be decided whether scepticism and tolerance are preferable to blind and intolerant belief".

"There are no ideas. There are only human existences in concrete situations, which act and react in their specific way on each and every respective occasion; one of these specific ways consists, in accordance with standard terminology, in thinking up or appropriating ideas. Ideas do not come into contact with one another, but only human existences come into contact with one another, which inside of organised societies must act in the name of ideas; combinations of ideas are likewise the work of human existences, which, when they apply themselves to this work, start from their own relationship with other existences; and, finally, ideas are not defeated nor do they win, but their victory or their defeat stands symbolically for the predominance or the subjugation of certain human existences. As one can see, the centuries-long predominance of idealistic normativism (and every normativism contains essential idealistic elements, even when for polemical reasons it comes on the scene while flying the flag of materialism), forces us towards the rediscovery and renewed emphasising of banal truths - of truths, which in a very general form could possibly today be recognised by very many people, but whose logical consequences must meet with the resistance of every normativistic thought, that is, every objectivised decision".

"In other words: the complexity of the social makes the unintended and unexpected overall consequences of collective action more likely; the said complexity of the social intensifies the effect of the heterogony of ends. This effect was traditionally considered from the point of view of

the invisible hand, whereby (even) individual irrationalisms bring about, through their interweaving, a rational collective outcome. The reverse of that, however, can likewise happen, i.e. the sum of the partial rationalities can bring forth an irrational overall result. The “knowledgeable society” can only be constantly reproduced when the subjective expectations on the whole are satisfied, not only as to the mode of behaviour of each and every respective partner in interaction, but also as to the “system’s” overall performance. If there is a situation in which indeed mutual expectations are fulfilled, but the expected overall result of collective action fails to materialise, this means for a highly complex society, the state of affairs of absolute bafflement (or helplessness). Because the Archimedean point at which one could be in a position to reverse the trend is buried sometime (or other) somewhere (or other) in the thicket of complexity. Either, that is, highly complex society must forever secure for itself the material and other preconditions of its reproduction, or it must end in a historically unprecedented catastrophe”.

"The proposition that man’s nature is culture, actually means that man, under the pressure of (his) nature, had to become a being of culture, and that the voice of (his) nature is therefore to continue to be heard in all its tones and nuances in culture; man is just as little free to selectively treat (or deal with) culture as he was in primeval times free to stand still in a nature before culture, or as he is nowadays free to undo culture. The culture of man is therefore just as much nature as his nature is culture. And this fact must, social-ontologically, be meant (or thought of) together with the fact of society, which is equally old and original as man and culture, actually, the fact of society illustrates nothing other than the inseparability of man and culture. Man and culture are mediated via the

social relation and via the political (i.e. that which is between man and culture is mediated via the social relation and via the political; thereby, man develops as a being of culture and puts himself in a position to not only historicise his own, but also external nature. The becoming (or series of events) in external nature indeed does not change in its law bindedness (determinism or law-based necessity), but the becoming in external nature's effects (or consequences) with regard to the human collective depend henceforth on the culture of this same human collective. Still further: the structure of social cohesion and of social conditions (or circumstances) is not least of all determined by each and every respective outcome of the struggle of the human genus (i.e. race) against external nature. This great truth, which we owe to Marx, has never been so topical as today, when the (at least potential) overcoming of the age-old shortage of goods by means of rapid technical (i.e. technological) progress set in motion historically unprecedented changes (or transformations) of a planetary extent. However, precisely these changes (and transformations) allow us, on the other hand, to recognise with increasing clarity the embedding of culture in nature".

"One would supposedly not go wrong with the assumption that the factor "communication" (in the broader sense) would then gain the upper hand in the social perception vis-à-vis the factor "action" (in the narrower sense) if industry and agriculture were so productive that they only had to make use of the labour of a minority of the population, while the majority would carry out its labour (work) mainly via the exchange of signs and symbols (to say nothing of the increasing penetration of the production process itself by the communicative-informative factor). "Communication" becomes autonomous, in other words, ideationally vis-à-vis "acting (i.e. action)" in the same sense and to the same degree as fewer and fewer people produce what they consume, and as a result the production of goods for the most part is covered up or is even absorbed

by symbolic exchange (exchange of information and money, but also of services, which can be perceived as symbolic interaction). Consequently the impression comes into being that production or acting (i.e. action) mean very little and exchange or communication very much. However, it is here a matter of an optical illusion. Because the surplus of communication or exchange is reduced to a completely particular constitution (composition or texture) of action or of production, and under given circumstances the said surplus of communication or exchange must be produced so that action or production can be developed: e.g. without mass consumption, there is no mass production. As the exchange network of modern technicised societies would have to become much more wide-meshed should the production of goods suffer serious setbacks, so too the hard core of acting (i.e. action) – if one may say so – would put its narrower communicative aspect in the shade, if communication ground to a halt. That should mean that the communication process (or communicative event) as a whole unfolds against the background and under the influence of that hard core, just as without the near or far presence of tangible goods, exchange values eventually become fictive and uninteresting. Communication theoreticians of an ethical-normative or cybernetic mould, however, place no particular value on such considerations. They internalise mass democracy's criteria of perception and at the same time contribute their own criteria of perception for the theoretical underpinning of mass democracy's notions of harmony, while they reduce the real conflicts of action to obstacles to communication".

"This becomes more understandable in light of our ascertainment that every normification (i.e. normative standardisation) has its two sides, i.e. its constraints, and, its free space(s) [for individual action] or room to move. The image of "civilised" and rational-objective man above all "primitivisms", who in accordance with the view of the evolutionists of differentiation is supposed to formulate and carry out the normifications of highly complex "knowledgeable society", formally (i.e. in terms of form) corresponds with the ideal type of highly technicised (i.e. technologically advanced or hyperdeveloped) and highly rationalised (i.e. highly organised or systematised) processes in industry and administration. Such processes however make up only one side of social life in Western mass democracy. The other side, that of mass consumption, is connected with psychological and ethically very different

stances and modes of behaviour – although, both aforementioned sides are equally indispensable for mass democracy's continued existence, and they must compete and co-exist simultaneously with each other inside of society as well as inside of the individual psyche. If industrial mass production and administration require the activation of an impersonal instrumental rationality, then mass consumption favours, on the contrary, the individualistic-hedonistic ethic(s) of immediate (or direct) pleasure (or enjoyment) and generally of "self-realisation". On the basis of the mass consumption of material and intellectual(-spiritual) goods, and against the background of world-theoretical and ethical pantheism, all sorts of irrationalisms, which spellbind all the more people, the more increased productivity decreases the number of those directly participating in technical-rational processes, come into being and thrive. The asymmetry between the "rationality" of technology (technique) and production, and ideological-world-theoretical "irrationality", does not of course constitute a specific feature (or characteristic) of mass-producing and mass-consuming mass democracy, even if the said mass democracy has been connected here with absolutely contrary content(s): whereas in societies in which the shortage of goods held sway, the "irrational" as a rule legitimised ascetic virtues and social hierarchies, the "irrational" in a society, which for the first time in history has basically overcome the shortage of goods, promotes hedonistic and individualistic or egalitarian notions and stances. Nevertheless, from the point of view of our formulation of the question (i.e. examination of the problem), not this specific contrast, but the structural commonality is more important. Pre-modern societies also handled technology (technique) and production on the basis of the instrumental rationality of means and end(s) (the procession (or litany) and the prayer for rain did not mean that one had not otherwise done all that appeared expedient for a good yield (or harvest) through the application of existing empirical findings). But instrumental rationality at this level did not in the least constitute the method of thought which shaped the general world theory (i.e. world view). There are no grounds for the assumption that this will now be fundamentally different. Against the background of the same industry and technology (technique), a number of "rationalisms" and "irrationalisms" are today, as in the past, possible; and the social-ontological or anthropological framework is expected, as a result of new technical (and or technological) developments, to change just as little as through the invention of typography and of ballistics at the threshold of the New Times".

"The seemingly disarming thesis that the politicisation of a complex modern society would destroy this society, basically constitutes a banality, which applies to all societies and with regard to every subsystem (or part system). No society could centre on a single activity, entirely regardless of each and every respective historically determined degree of interweaving of individual social activities with one another. The dogged effort at centring social life on aesthetic, religious, scientific or economic activity would not have a less devastating effect than the consistent claim of a monopoly of politics. The specific political point of view concerns the manner (or method) of the subsystems' (or part systems') coherence, not necessarily the manner (or method) as to how inside of each and every respective subsystem (or part system) the corresponding social activity is carried out. So-called "totalitarian" attempts, of religious or other inspiration, at comprehensively subjugating the various social activities to one sole point of view, can indeed lead to the reinforced (intensified or increased) control of man, but not to the abolition of the specific character of the corresponding activities. Even a deeply religious society must cultivate its fields, and it cannot replace tillage (or agriculture) with worship and prayer, even if prayers and ritual acts would constantly accompany agro-economic activity as such. The same applies to the other social activities, to say nothing of the personal activities, and that is why no "totalitarianism" and no "despotism" can be as comprehensive as they perhaps wanted to be in respect of their claim, or as they often appear to be in demonising descriptions. Over and above that, it is a purely fictive notion to thus interpret the evolutionistic schema of differentiation as though in the "pre-modern" past the lack of differentiation of the subsystems (or part systems) enabled a primacy of the political which is no longer applicable. In the hitherto described basic constellation, hardly anything has changed through the centuries despite

the (great) variety of institutional forms. An “oriental despotism (i.e. despotic regime)” could and wanted to influence the production method (mode or manner of production), or the patriarchal institutions of the village community living under it, only within narrow limits, whereas the theoretical precedence of “politics”, understood in Aristotelian terms, in the European Middle Ages did not at all exclude feudal fragmentation and local autonomy; phenomena of a refeudalisation on a highly technicised (i.e. high-technology) basis in modern mass democracies have just as little to do with a drastic change (or transformation) in the status and in the function of politics, but they interrelate with economic and social developments, which pose the question of the cohesion of society on a new basis. However, this question remains, and with it politics remains too, particularly if no-one can know whether the material preconditions of the modern processes of differentiation will survive (endure, persist or remain) in the future or not".

"Now, the self-understanding of a social formation appears as objective self-knowledge and knowledge of history only so long as the social formation in question is on the up and up and clears its adversaries out of the way. That is today the case with mass democracy. However, precisely at its planetary high point, its own contradictions, in fact its explosive potentialities, which were intimated at the beginning of this chapter, become increasingly apparent. Social-theoretically, mass democracy's contradictions and explosive potentialities are of importance because they make known in themselves the topicality of the classical question formulations. The increasing complexity in terms of detail brings about a

reduction of the great aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) to formulae of almost archaic simplicity. After the decline of bourgeois anthropocentrism, and under the conditions of planetarily unfolded (or developed) highly technicised (i.e. technologically advanced) mass democracy, the question regarding man's essence (or nature) and possibilities is posed even more directly and more acutely than at the threshold of the European New Times. On the one hand, the image of man is unified like never before by means of the henceforth dense (or compact) existing side by side, or existing inside of one another, cultures, nations and races, while at the same time the waning significance of historical and social attributes for the determination of human identity, as a result of the spreading of universalistic ideologies, paradoxically but logically reduces man to his constitution (composition, texture or nature) as biological being; on the other hand, this man reduced to his mere humanness (or human quality), that is, man in general and as such, stands across from nature, he must in a time of highly demographic and ecological tension measure his powers against nature's powers. The question about the animal, which creates tools on a planet populated by billions which has already become narrow (i.e. cramped), is posed no less acutely and no less elementarily than before a few millions of years ago in the African savannas when hordes of animals [or (proto)humans] wandered around. And likewise the other great social-ontological question must appear on the horizon as acute and elementary, that great social-ontological question regarding social cohesion and social order, if namely the relations between humans reach such a density and intensity that the boundaries of every known political unit (unity or entity) from the past will become full of holes or even burst open".

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